Autonomy-Oriented Social Movements and the Politics of Affect

Abstract This dissertation explores damaging tendencies that exist within autonomy-oriented activism in the West. I examine how affect shapes the way that internal conflict is approached and internal strife is dealt with in radical communities. I adopt Sara Ahmed’s proposition “that our emotions are bound up with the securing of the social hierarchy” (Ahmed, 2004b: 4) and given that autonomy-oriented practices are committed to dismantling existing hierarchies, it follows that the less oppressive social configurations sought by autonomous social movements must have different emotional underpinnings. My thesis involves applying critical theory on affect and emotion in social movements to interview data gathered from activists both currently and historically involved in autonomy-oriented social movement communities in Kingston, Ontario. I ask whether anglophone, western-based, autonomy-oriented social movements reproduced understandings of affect/emotions/feelings that underwrite the social order they are working against? I also ask, “how are our emotions conditioned by capitalism?”. The research that I engage with provides responses to these questions by pointing out how the dominant discourse on emotions in the West encourages and informs certain modes of identity production that affect the diminishing and sad practices of autonomy-oriented communities and the (re)production of oppressive practices found in the dominant order. My work critically places this psychologizing view of emotions, and its damaging effects on resistance, within the context of neoliberal capitalism. I argue that the way we understand the politics of affect is an important dimension of radical struggle, and will inform and impact upon our individual and collective capacities to respond to, and refuse to reproduce relations of control and domination. I look for an understanding of “why” and to “what extent” these determinations exists, and look for hope in a politics of affect which supports an autonomy-oriented ethic.

A Restorative Theory of Criminal Justice

In this project, I defend a restorative theory of criminal justice. I argue that the response to criminal wrongdoing in a just society should take the form of an attempt to heal the damage done to the community resulting from crime. I argue that the moral responsibilities of wrongdoers as wrongdoers ought to provide the framework for how a just society should respond to crime. Following the work of R.A. Duff, I argue that wrongdoers incur second-order duties of moral recognition. Wrongdoers owe it to others to recognize their wrongdoing for what it is, i.e. wrongdoing, and to shoulder certain burdens in order to express their repentant recognition to others via a meaningful apology. In short, wrongdoers owe it to their victims and others in the community to make amends. What I will deny, however, is the now familiar claim in the restorative justice literature that restoring the normative relationships in the community damaged by criminal forms of wrongdoing requires retributive punishment. In my view, how we choose to express the judgement that wrongdoers are blameworthy should flow from an all things considered judgment that is neither reducible to the judgement that the wrongdoer is culpably responsible for wronging others, nor the judgement that the wrongdoer in some basic sense “deserves to suffer” (or “deserves punishment,” etc.).