'A Kind of Logic, A Kind of Dominant Logic': Navigating Colonialism, Honoring Black Mobility, and Thinking on Moving Through

My thesis thinks through the ways Newtonian logics require linear mobility in order to produce narratives of progress. I argue that this linear mobility, and the resulting logics, potentially erases the chaotic and non-linear motions that are required to navigate a colonial landscape. I suggest that these non-linear movements produce important critiques of the seeming stasis of colonial constructs and highlight the ways these logics must appear neutral and scientific in an attempt to conceal the constant and complex adjustments these frameworks require. In order to make room for these complex motions, I develop a quantum intervention. Specifically, I use quantum physics as a metaphor to think through the significance of black life, the double-consciousness ofland, and the intricate motions of sound. In order to put forth this intervention, I look at news coverage of Hurricane Katrina, Du Bois’s characterization of land in Souls of Black Folks, and the aural mobilities of blackness articulated in an academic discussion and interview about post- humanism.

WAKING (TO) THINKING BEING: A STUDY OF EDUCATION, METAPHYSICS, MIND, AND LANGUAGE

This dissertation articulates the basic aims and achievements of education. It recognizes language as central to thinking, and philosophy and education as belonging profoundly to one another. The first step is to show that although philosophy can no longer claim to dictate the foundations of knowledge or of disciplines of inquiry, it still offers an exceptionally general level of self-understanding. Education is equally general and faces a similar crisis of self-identity, of coming to terms with reality. Language is the medium of thought and the repository of historical mind; so a child’s acquisition of language is her acquisition of rational freedom. This marks a metaphysical change: no longer merely an animal, she comes to exercise her powers of rationality, transcending her environment by seeking and expressing reasons for thinking and doing. She can think about herself in relation to the universe, hence philosophize and educate others in turn. The discussion then turns to the historical nature of language. The thinking already embedded in language always anticipates further questioning. Etymology serves as a model for philosophical understanding, and demonstrates how philosophy can continue to yield insights that are fundamental, but not foundational, to human life. The etymologies of some basic educational concepts disclose education as a leading out and into the midst of Being. The philosophical approach developed in previous chapters applies to the very idea of an educational aim. Discussion concerning the substantiality of educational ideals results in an impasse: one side recommends an open-­ended understanding of education’s aims; the other insists on a definitive account. However, educational ideals exhibit a conceptual duality: the fundamental achievements of education, such as rational freedom, are real; but how we should understand them remains an open question. The penultimate chapter investigates philosophical thinking as the fulfillment of rational freedom, whose creative insights can profoundly transform our everyday activities. That this transformative self-understanding is without end suggests the basic aims of education are unheimlich. The dissertation concludes with speculative reflection on the shape and nature of language, and with the suggestion that through education reality awakens to itself.

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.

Experience, Education and Subjectivity: A Comparison of John Dewey's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Conceptions of Experience and Their Implications for Education

This thesis compares John Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and illustrates how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can strengthen and further Dewey’s philosophy of education. I begin by drawing the connection between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and his philosophy of education, and illustrate how Dewey’s understanding of growth, and thinking in education, is rooted in and informed by his detailed philosophy of experience. From there, I give an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with a focus on his descriptions of subjectivity that he presents in the Phenomenology of Perception. Following this, I outline some of the implications Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has on our understanding of rationality, expression and existence. In the final chapter, I make the comparison between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. After demonstrating how these two philosophies are not only similar but also complementary, I then look to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to provide insight into and to advance Dewey’s philosophy of education. I will illustrate how Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of subjectivity helps to support, and reinforce the rationale behind Dewey’s inquiry-based approach to education. Furthermore, I will show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and its implications for rationality, expression and existence support Dewey’s democratic ideal and add a hermeneutical element to Dewey’s philosophy of education.