Communication-efficient decentralized sequential detection

The problem of decentralized sequential detection is studied in this thesis, where local sensors are memoryless, receive independent observations, and no feedback from the fusion center. In addition to traditional criteria of detection delay and error probability, we introduce a new constraint: the number of communications between local sensors and the fusion center. This metric is able to reflect both the cost of establishing communication links as well as overall energy consumption over time. A new formulation for communication-efficient decentralized sequential detection is proposed where the overall detection delay is minimized with constraints on both error probabilities and the communication cost. Two types of problems are investigated based on the communication-efficient formulation: decentralized hypothesis testing and decentralized change detection. In the former case, an asymptotically person-by-person optimum detection framework is developed, where the fusion center performs a sequential probability ratio test based on dependent observations. The proposed algorithm utilizes not only reported statistics from local sensors, but also the reporting times. The asymptotically relative efficiency of proposed algorithm with respect to the centralized strategy is expressed in closed form. When the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection are close to one another, a reduced-complexity algorithm is proposed based on a Poisson arrival approximation. In addition, decentralized change detection with a communication cost constraint is also investigated. A person-by-person optimum change detection algorithm is proposed, where transmissions of sensing reports are modeled as a Poisson process. The optimum threshold value is obtained through dynamic programming. An alternative method with a simpler fusion rule is also proposed, where the threshold values in the algorithm are determined by a combination of sequential detection analysis and constrained optimization. In both decentralized hypothesis testing and change detection problems, tradeoffs in parameter choices are investigated through Monte Carlo simulations.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.