Healthcare and the Common Good: Restructuring the Economy of Medical Knowledge through Communitarian Political Theory

The pharmaceutical industry wields disproportionate power and control within the medical economy of knowledge where the desire for profit considerably outweighs health for its own sake. Utilizing the theoretical tools of political philosophy, this project restructures the economy of medical knowledge in order to lessen the oligarchical control possessed by the pharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, this project argues that an economy of medical knowledge structured around communitarian political theory lessens the current power dynamic without taking an anti-capitalist stance. Arising from the core commitments of communitarian-liberalism, the production, distribution, and consumption of medical knowledge all become guided processes seeking to realize the common good of quality healthcare. This project also considers two other theoretical approaches: liberalism and egalitarianism. A Medical knowledge economy structured around liberal political theory is ultimately rejected as it empowers the oligarchical status quo. Egalitarian political theory is able to significantly reduce the power imbalance problem but simultaneously renders inconsequential medical knowledge; therefore, it is also rejected.

A Restorative Theory of Criminal Justice

In this project, I defend a restorative theory of criminal justice. I argue that the response to criminal wrongdoing in a just society should take the form of an attempt to heal the damage done to the community resulting from crime. I argue that the moral responsibilities of wrongdoers as wrongdoers ought to provide the framework for how a just society should respond to crime. Following the work of R.A. Duff, I argue that wrongdoers incur second-order duties of moral recognition. Wrongdoers owe it to others to recognize their wrongdoing for what it is, i.e. wrongdoing, and to shoulder certain burdens in order to express their repentant recognition to others via a meaningful apology. In short, wrongdoers owe it to their victims and others in the community to make amends. What I will deny, however, is the now familiar claim in the restorative justice literature that restoring the normative relationships in the community damaged by criminal forms of wrongdoing requires retributive punishment. In my view, how we choose to express the judgement that wrongdoers are blameworthy should flow from an all things considered judgment that is neither reducible to the judgement that the wrongdoer is culpably responsible for wronging others, nor the judgement that the wrongdoer in some basic sense “deserves to suffer” (or “deserves punishment,” etc.).