Please Stop Rubbing Your Relationship In My Face(book): An Investigation of Online Romantic Social Comparison

It is well-documented that social networking sites such as Facebook set the stage for social comparison. Such comparison has been linked to a number of negative outcomes including envy, negative moods, and lower self-esteem. The present research aims to extend current understanding of online social comparison by investigating how it pertains to romantic relationships. I hypothesized that for individuals high in attachment anxiety (compared to those low in this construct), online romantic social comparison might be related to negative consequences—which, in the current project, was operationalized as lower mood/affect and state self-esteem. Further, I hypothesized that there would be an interaction between attachment anxiety and relationship insecurities on these negative outcomes, such that the expected difference of attachment anxiety would be more pronounced under conditions priming relationship insecurities, relative to a control condition. Two experiments were conducted, one of which focused on single individuals, and the second focusing on individuals who were themselves in dating relationships. The paradigms of each entailed experimental manipulation of a key relationship-related variable (for single individuals, pessimism for future relationships; for dating individuals, the presence or absence of rejection threat), subsequent exposure to romantic content from Facebook, and finally, measures of affect and state self-esteem. I discovered partial support for the hypothesis that some single individuals—particularly those with higher, rather than lower, attachment anxiety—do indeed report feeling more negative moods and lower state self-esteem following exposure to romantic online content, in contrast to single individuals who had instead viewed neutral online content. The association between attachment anxiety and negative outcome was especially pertinent if individuals had been primed to believe that their own future romantic prospects were grim, or if attention had been drawn to their singleness. Among dating individuals, less support for hypotheses was found; however, exploratory post-hoc analyses revealed a promising (albeit weak) trend indicating that reinvestigation of the current hypotheses would be prudent.

Understanding Online Abuse: An Analysis of Abuse Against Women Content Creators

This research is an examination into the ways online abuse functions in certain online spaces. By analyzing text-based online abuse against women who are content creators, this research maps how aspects of violence against women offline extends online. This research examines three different explorations into how online abuse against women functions. Chapter two considers what online abuse against women looks like on Twitter as a case study. This chapter contends that online abuse can be understood as an unintentional use of Twitter’s design. Chapter three focuses specifically on the textual descriptions of sexual violence women who are journalists receive online. Chapter four analyzes Gamergate, an online movement that specifically looks to organize online abuse towards women. Chapter five concludes by meditating on the need to look at a bigger picture that includes cultural shifts that dismantle the normalization of violence against women both on and offline.

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.

Experience, Education and Subjectivity: A Comparison of John Dewey's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Conceptions of Experience and Their Implications for Education

This thesis compares John Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and illustrates how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can strengthen and further Dewey’s philosophy of education. I begin by drawing the connection between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and his philosophy of education, and illustrate how Dewey’s understanding of growth, and thinking in education, is rooted in and informed by his detailed philosophy of experience. From there, I give an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with a focus on his descriptions of subjectivity that he presents in the Phenomenology of Perception. Following this, I outline some of the implications Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has on our understanding of rationality, expression and existence. In the final chapter, I make the comparison between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. After demonstrating how these two philosophies are not only similar but also complementary, I then look to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to provide insight into and to advance Dewey’s philosophy of education. I will illustrate how Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of subjectivity helps to support, and reinforce the rationale behind Dewey’s inquiry-based approach to education. Furthermore, I will show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and its implications for rationality, expression and existence support Dewey’s democratic ideal and add a hermeneutical element to Dewey’s philosophy of education.