The political economy of industrial policy in Peru and Ecuador: 1980-2010

This dissertation focuses on industrial policy in two developing countries: Peru and Ecuador. Informed by comparative historical analysis, it explains how the Import-Substitution Industrialization policies promoted during the 1970s by military administration unravelled in the following 30 years under the guidance of Washington Consensus policies. Positioning political economy in time, the research objectives were two-fold: understanding long-term policy reform patterns, including the variables that conditioned cyclical versus path-dependent dynamics of change and; secondly, investigating the direction and leverage of state institutions supporting the manufacturing sector at the dawn, peak and consolidation of neoliberal discourse in both countries. Three interconnected causal mechanisms explain the divergence of trajectories: institutional legacies, coordination among actors and economic distribution of power. Peru’s long tradition of a minimal state contrasts with the embedded character of Ecuador long tradition of legal protectionism dating back to the Liberal Revolution. Peru’s close policy coordination among stakeholders –state technocrats and business elites- differs from Ecuador’s “winners-take-all” approach for policy-making. Peru’s economic dynamism concentrated in Lima sharply departs from Ecuador’s competitive regional economic leaderships. This dissertation paid particular attention to methodology to understand the intersection between structure and agency in policy change. Tracing primary and secondary sources, as well as key pieces of legislation, became critical to understand key turning points and long-term patterns of change. Open-ended interviews (N=58) with two stakeholder groups (business elites and bureaucrats) compounded the effort to knit motives, discourses, and interests behind this long transition. In order to understand this amount of data, this research build an index of policy intervention as a methodological contribution to assess long patterns of policy change. These findings contribute to the current literature on State-market relations and varieties of capitalism, institutional change, and policy reform.

Degeneracy of velocity constraints in rigid body systems

The equations governing the dynamics of rigid body systems with velocity constraints are singular at degenerate configurations in the constraint distribution. In this report, we describe the causes of singularities in the constraint distribution of interconnected rigid body systems with smooth configuration manifolds. A convention of defining primary velocity constraints in terms of orthogonal complements of one-dimensional subspaces is introduced. Using this convention, linear maps are defined and used to describe the space of allowable velocities of a rigid body. Through the definition of these maps, we present a condition for non-degeneracy of velocity constraints in terms of the one dimensional subspaces defining the primary velocity constraints. A method for defining the constraint subspace and distribution in terms of linear maps is presented. Using these maps, the constraint distribution is shown to be singular at configuration where there is an increase in its dimension.