Bipartite Assertion: A New Account of Assertion, Defined in Terms of Responsibility and Explicit Presentation

Assertion is a speech act that stands at the intersection of the philosophy of language and social epistemology. It is a phenomenon that bears on such wide-ranging topics as testimony, truth, meaning, knowledge and trust. It is thus no surprise that analytic philosophers have devoted innumerable pages to assertion, trying to give the norms that govern it, its role in the transmission of knowledge, and most importantly, what assertion is, or how assertion is to be defined. In this thesis I attempt to show that all previous answers to the question “What is assertion?” are flawed. There are four major traditions in the literature: constitutive norm theories of assertion, accounts that treat assertion as the expression of speaker attitudes, accounts that treat assertion as a proposal to add some proposition to the common ground, and accounts that treat assertion as the taking of responsibility for some claim. Each tradition is explored here, the leading theories within the tradition developed, and then placed under scrutiny to demonstrate flaws within the positions surveyed. I follow the work of G.E. Moore and William P. Alston, whilst drawing on the work of Robert Brandom in order to give a new bipartite theory of assertion. I argue that assertion consists in the explicit presentation of a proposition, along with a taking of responsibility for that proposition. Taking Alston's explicit presentation condition and repairing it in order to deal with problems it faces, whilst combining it with Brandom's responsibility condition, provides, I believe, the best account of assertion.

SENSORIMOTOR WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY LIMITS

Two novel studies examining the capacity and characteristics of working memory for object weights, experienced through lifting, were completed. Both studies employed visually identical objects of varying weight and focused on memories linking object locations and weights. Whereas numerous studies have examined the capacity of visual working memory, the capacity of sensorimotor memory involved in motor control and object manipulation has not yet been explored. In addition to assessing working memory for object weights using an explicit perceptual test, we also assessed memory for weight using an implicit measure based on motor performance. The vertical lifting or LF and the horizontal GF applied during lifts, measured from force sensors embedded in the object handles, were used to assess participants’ ability to predict object weights. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with sets of 3, 4, 5, 7 or 9 objects. They lifted each object in the set and then repeated this procedure 10 times with the objects lifted either in a fixed or random order. Sensorimotor memory was examined by assessing, as a function of object set size, how lifting forces changed across successive lifts of a given object. The results indicated that force scaling for weight improved across the repetitions of lifts, and was better for smaller set sizes when compared to the larger set sizes, with the latter effect being clearest when objects were lifting in a random order. However, in general the observed force scaling was poorly scaled. In Experiment 2, working memory was examined in two ways: by determining participants’ ability to detect a change in the weight of one of 3 to 6 objects lifted twice, and by simultaneously measuring the fingertip forces applied when lifting the objects. The results showed that, even when presented with 6 objects, participants were extremely accurate in explicitly detecting which object changed weight. In addition, force scaling for object weight, which was generally quite weak, was similar across set sizes. Thus, a capacity limit less than 6 was not found for either the explicit or implicit measures collected.