Bipartite Assertion: A New Account of Assertion, Defined in Terms of Responsibility and Explicit Presentation

Assertion is a speech act that stands at the intersection of the philosophy of language and social epistemology. It is a phenomenon that bears on such wide-ranging topics as testimony, truth, meaning, knowledge and trust. It is thus no surprise that analytic philosophers have devoted innumerable pages to assertion, trying to give the norms that govern it, its role in the transmission of knowledge, and most importantly, what assertion is, or how assertion is to be defined. In this thesis I attempt to show that all previous answers to the question “What is assertion?” are flawed. There are four major traditions in the literature: constitutive norm theories of assertion, accounts that treat assertion as the expression of speaker attitudes, accounts that treat assertion as a proposal to add some proposition to the common ground, and accounts that treat assertion as the taking of responsibility for some claim. Each tradition is explored here, the leading theories within the tradition developed, and then placed under scrutiny to demonstrate flaws within the positions surveyed. I follow the work of G.E. Moore and William P. Alston, whilst drawing on the work of Robert Brandom in order to give a new bipartite theory of assertion. I argue that assertion consists in the explicit presentation of a proposition, along with a taking of responsibility for that proposition. Taking Alston's explicit presentation condition and repairing it in order to deal with problems it faces, whilst combining it with Brandom's responsibility condition, provides, I believe, the best account of assertion.

Experience, Education and Subjectivity: A Comparison of John Dewey's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Conceptions of Experience and Their Implications for Education

This thesis compares John Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and illustrates how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can strengthen and further Dewey’s philosophy of education. I begin by drawing the connection between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and his philosophy of education, and illustrate how Dewey’s understanding of growth, and thinking in education, is rooted in and informed by his detailed philosophy of experience. From there, I give an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with a focus on his descriptions of subjectivity that he presents in the Phenomenology of Perception. Following this, I outline some of the implications Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has on our understanding of rationality, expression and existence. In the final chapter, I make the comparison between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. After demonstrating how these two philosophies are not only similar but also complementary, I then look to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to provide insight into and to advance Dewey’s philosophy of education. I will illustrate how Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of subjectivity helps to support, and reinforce the rationale behind Dewey’s inquiry-based approach to education. Furthermore, I will show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and its implications for rationality, expression and existence support Dewey’s democratic ideal and add a hermeneutical element to Dewey’s philosophy of education.