DIGITAL HISTORY: DESIGNING VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS THAT SUPPORT CRITICAL THINKING AND IDEA EXCHANGE, MOTIVATE AND ENGAGE USERS

In my thesis I argue for the use of system designs that: a) open access to a variety of users and allow for collaboration and idea exchange, while at the same time, b) are designed to motivate and engage users. To exemplify my proposed systems design, I created an interactive and open digital history project focused on Romanian culture and identity during Communism, from 1947, when the Communist Party took power by forcing the King to abdicate, until the revolution in 1989, which marked the end of Communism in Romania (Gilberg, 1990, Boia, 2014). In my project, I present the possibility to recreate Habermas’ notion of public sphere and “the unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1989) and Dewey’s (2004) understanding of democracy as a mode of associated living imbued of the spirit of inquiry within contemporary digital history projects. Second, I outline system designs that motivate and engage users, by satisfying the basic psychological needs outlined in Ryan and Deci’s (2000) self-determination theory: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Two more concepts are included to complete the proposed digital history project design: presence (Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylski, 2006) and learner hero (Rigby & Przybylski, 2009).

"Biggest Scandal in Canadian History": HRDC Audit Starts Probity War (Working Paper 23)

The article describes the nearly year-long political and media uproar that followed on the release in January, 2000 of a qualitative or soft “audit” of management control in the federal government department, Human Resources Development Canada, and analyses the contributing factors. The article argues that the auditors’ examination of project files for programs delivered by grants and contributions was so abstract and poorly executed that nothing whatever can be concluded from the work. Factors that favoured the “scandal” interpretation include across-government New Public Management reforms where accountability has not been re-theorized for Canada’s Westminster system of government; Canada’s electoral volatility that starves the country of experienced politicians and spurs the tradition of political compensation for electoral support; and the political role of the Office of the Auditor General. This paper has been accepted for publication by the journal Critical Perspectives on Accounting, which holds copyright.