Restrictions on Aliens in the United Kingdom, 1914-1919 : a Study of the Origins and Political Background of the Aliens Restrictions Acts of 1914 and 1919.

At first glance the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, which was introduced and passed on the first day of World War One, seems a hasty and ill-prepared piece of legislation. Actually, when examined in the light of Arthur Marwick's thesis that war is a forcing house for pre-existent social and governmental ideas, it becomes clear that the act was not after all the product of hastily formed notions. In point of fact it followed the precedent of detailed draft clauses produced in 1911 by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence established to consider the treatment of aliens in the event of war. Indeed the draft clauses and the restrictions embodied in the 1914 act were strikingly similar to restrictions on aliens legislated in 1793. Hostility to aliens had been growing from 1905 to 1914 and this hostility blossomed into xeno-phobia on the outbreak of war, a crucial precondition for the specifically anti-enemy fears of the time. In 1919 the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Bill was introduced into parliament to extend temporarily the provisions of the 1914 act thus permitting the Home Secretary to plan permanent, detailed legislation. Two minority groups of MPs with extreme views on the treatment of aliens were prominent in the debates on this bill. The extreme Liberal group which advocated leniency in the treatment of aliens had little effect on the final form of the bill, but the extreme Conservative group, which demanded severe restrictions on aliens, succeeded in persuading the government to include detailed restrictions. Despite its allegedly temporary nature, the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919 was renewed annually until 1971.

Between Principle and Practicality: A Dynamic Realist Examination of Independence in the Canadian Justice System

This work examines independence in the Canadian justice system using an approach adapted from new legal realist scholarship called ‘dynamic realism’. This approach proposes that issues in law must be considered in relation to their recursive and simultaneous development with historic, social and political events. Such events describe ‘law in action’ and more holistically demonstrate principles like independence, rule of law and access to justice. My dynamic realist analysis of independence in the justice system employs a range methodological tools and approaches from the social sciences, including: historical and historiographical study; public administrative; policy and institutional analysis; an empirical component; as well as constitutional, statutory interpretation and jurisprudential analysis. In my view, principles like independence represent aspirational ideals in law which can be better understood by examining how they manifest in legal culture and in the legal system. This examination focuses on the principle and practice of independence for both lawyers and judges in the justice system, but highlights the independence of the Bar. It considers the inter-relation between lawyer independence and the ongoing refinement of judicial independence in Canadian law. It also considers both independence of the Bar and the Judiciary in the context of the administration of justice, and practically illustrates the interaction between these principles through a case study of a specific aspect of the court system. This work also focuses on recent developments in the principle of Bar independence and its relation to an emerging school of professionalism scholarship in Canada. The work concludes by describing the principle of independence as both conditional and dynamic, but rooted in a unitary concept for both lawyers and judges. In short, independence can be defined as impartiality, neutrality and autonomy of legal decision-makers in the justice system to apply, protect and improve the law for what has become its primary normative purpose: facilitating access to justice. While both independence of the Bar and the Judiciary are required to support access to independent courts, some recent developments suggest the practical interactions between independence and access need to be the subject of further research, to better account for both the principles and the practicalities of the Canadian justice system.