Discovery and settlement of Alaska coaster

Tsar Peter the Great ruled Russia between 1689 and 1725. Its domains, stretching from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east. From north to south, its empire stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the borders with China and India. Tsar Peter I tried to extend the geographical knowledge of his government and the rest of the world. He was also interested in the expansion of trade in Russia and in the control of trade routes. Feodor Luzhin and Ivan Yeverinov explored the eastern border of the Russian Empire, the trip between 1719 and 1721 and reported to the Tsar. They had crossed the peninsula of Kamchatka, from west to east and had traveled from the west coast of Kamchatka to the Kuril Islands. The information collected led to the first map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands. Tsar Peter ordered Bering surf the Russian Pacific coast, build ships and sail the seas north along the coast to regions of America. The second expedition found equal to those of the previous explorers difficulties. Two ships were eventually thrown away in Okhotsk in 1740. The explorers spent the winter of 1740-1741 stockpiling supplies and then navigate to Petropavlovsk. The two ships sailed eastward and did together until June 20, then separated by fog. After searching Chirikov and his boat for several days, Bering ordered the San Pedro continue to the northeast. There the Russian sailors first sighted Alaska. According to the log, "At 12:30 (pm July 17) in sight of snow-capped mountains and between them a high volcano." This finding came the day of St. Elijah and so named the mountain.

The Communicative Dimension and Security in Asia-Pacific: A communicative-viewing proposal for reform of the Japanese Intelligence Services

The postwar development of the Intelligence Services in Japan has been based on two contrasting models: the centralized model of the USA and the collegiality of UK, neither of which has been fully developed. This has led to clashes of institutional competencies and poor anticipation of threats towards national security. This problem of opposing models has been partially overcome through two dimensions: externally through the cooperation with the US Intelligence Service under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; and internally though the pre-eminence in the national sphere of the Department of Public Safety. However, the emergence of a new global communicative dimension requires that a communicative-viewing remodeling of this dual model is necessary due to the increasing capacity of the individual actors to determine the dynamics of international events. This article examines these challenges for the Intelligence Services of Japan and proposes a reform based on this new global communicative dimension.