Hybrid philosophy and rational vitalism in Canguilhem and Ortega y Gasset

This paper explores the problem of the synthesis between vitalism and rationalism, in contemporary philosophy. With this aim, we compare the intellectual careers of Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) and José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955). We contrast their conceptions of philosophy as “hybrid” knowledge, closely related to science, as well as their points of view on Vitalism, anthropology, the technique and the perspectivism. To avoid that comparison is purely abstract and ahistorical, we use the method of the sociology of philosophy. This forces us to locate both paths in their respective philosophical fields and generational units, also according to his social background and professional career.

Humanism is a violence typical of the beasts. Philosozing with a Hammer, using Levinas and Derrida, the Measure of the Human and the Human as a measure

Levinas’s reflections arose as a critique of traditional philosophy which, since it was based on presence and identity, leads to the exclusion of the other. Instead of an onto-logical thought the Lithuanian proposes that the ipseity of the human being be constituted by alterity, and that it be so ethically, because the subject is sub-ject, that is, that which upholds, responsibility. In an attempt to take the obligatory attention to the otherness of the other even further, Derrida would develop a radical critique of the Levinasian posture. Deconstruction of every trace of ipseity and sovereignty in the relationship with the other, the reading that we have done of the work of Derrida opts for a no definable understanding of the human. That is why every de-limitation of an ethical field as a properly human implies a brutal violence that the levinasian humanism of the other tried to exceed.