Profitability and the poor: corporate strategies, innovation and sustainability

Based on empirical evidence, the article looks at the implications of private sector participation (PSP) for the delivery of water supply and sanitation to the urban and peri-urban poor in developing countries, with particular reference to Africa and Latin America. More precisely, the article addresses the impact produced by multinational companies’ (MNCs) strategies, in light of the pursuit of profitability, on the extension of connections to the pipeline network. It does so by questioning the assumptions that greater private sector efficiency and innovation, together with contract design, will enable the sustainable extension of service coverage to low income dwellers. The strategies of the major water MNCs are considered both in relation to the global expansion of their operations and the adjustment of local strategies to commercial considerations. The latter might result in identifying proWtable markets, modifying contractual provisions, attempting to reduce costs and increase income, reducing risks and exiting from non-performing contracts. The evidence reviewed allows for re-assessing the relative roles of the public and private sectors in extending and delivering water services to the poor. First, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity than from MNCs. Secondly, whenever MNCs are liable to exit from non-profitable contracts, the public sector has no other option than to deal with external risks aVecting continuity of provision. Finally, market limitations affecting MNCs’ ability to serve marginal populations and access cheap capital do not apply to well-organised, politically led public sector undertakings

Financing the development of poor communities in the Northern Cape of South Africa - an analytical framework for the study of livestock banks

This paper is part of a major project about the Northern Cape Land Reform and Advocacy (NCLRA) programme being implemented by FARM-Africa* in South Africa. The NCLRA programme had initiated a financial mechanism to help poor communities to get access to finance and training in order to enable them to make better use of their newly-acquired land. One prominent aspect of the programme is the implementation of Livestock Banks, or the use of animals as financial products. The paper provides an analytical framework with which to evaluate the effectiveness of Livestock Banks in the poor communities of the Northern Cape in South Africa. It focuses on the design, implementation and future of Livestock Banks. The paper argues that Livestock Banks need to be reformed and enhanced if they are to continue to play a key role in the goal of creating financial and economic value in Africa, particularly when the primary objective is simultaneously to help reduce poverty. [Note]*FARM-Africa (Food & Agricultural Research Management) is a registered UK charity organisation and a company limited by guarantee in England and Wales no. 01926828.

Water

The Water chapter of the Poor Choices report.

Industrial water pollution in Dhaka, Bangladesh: strategies and incentives for pollution control in small and medium enterprises

The extent and gravity of the environmental degradation of the water resources in Dhaka due to untreated industrial waste is not fully recognised in international discourse. Pollution levels affect vast numbers, but the poor and the vulnerable are the worst affected. For example, rice productivity, the mainstay of poor farmers, in the Dhaka watershed has declined by 40% over a period of ten years. The study found significant correlations between water pollution and diseases such as jaundice, diarrhoea and skin problems. It was reported that the cost of treatment of one episode of skin disease could be as high as 29% of the weekly earnings of some of the poorest households. The dominant approach to deal with pollution in the SMEs is technocratic. Given the magnitude of the problem this paper argues that to control industrial pollution by SMEs and to enhance their compliance it is necessary to move from the technocratic approach to one which can also address the wider institutional and attitudinal issues. Underlying this shift is the need to adopt the appropriate methodology. The multi-stakeholder analysis enables an understanding of the actors, their influence, their capacity to participate in, or oppose change, and the existing and embedded incentive structures which allow them to pursue interests which are generally detrimental to environmental good. This enabled core and supporting strategies to be developed around three types of actors in industrial pollution, i.e., (i) principal actors, who directly contribute to industrial pollution; (ii) stakeholders who exacerbate the situation; and (iii) potential actors in mitigation. Within a carrot-and-stick framework, the strategies aim to improve environmental governance and transparency, set up a packet to incentive for industry and increase public awareness.

Strategies for water pollution control in Dhaka, Bangladesh: an institutional and economic analysis

This paper presents primary data based on research carried out as part of a large World Bank project. Results from our survey show that water pollution in Dhaka watershed has reached alarming levels and is posing significant threats to health and economic activity, particularly among the poor and vulnerable. Rice productivity in the watershed area, for example, has declined by 40% in recent years and vegetable cultivation in the riverbeds has been severely damaged. We also found significant correlation between water pollution and diseases such as jaundice, diarrhoea and skin problems. It was reported that the cost of treatment of skin diseases for one episode could be as high as 29% of the weekly earnings of poor households. Given the magnitude of the contamination problem, a multi-agent stakeholder approach was necessary to analyse the institutional and economic constraints that would need to be addressed in order to improve environmental management. This approach, in turn, enabled core strategies to be developed. The strategies were better understood around three types of actors in industrial pollution, i.e. (1) principal actors, who contribute directly to industrial pollution; (2) stakeholders, who exacerbate the situation by inaction; and (3) the potential actors in mitigation of water contamination. Within a carrot-and-stick framework, nine strategies leading to the strengthening of environmental management were explored. They aim at improving governance and transparency within public agencies and private industry through the setting up of incentive structures to advance compliance and enforcement of environmental standards. Civil society and the population at large are, on the other hand, encouraged to contribute actively to the mitigation of water pollution by improving the management of environmental information and by raising public awareness.

Energy

The Energy chapter of the Poor Choices report