Aspects of midwifery care 3: organisation of midwifery care

This is the third in a series of six papers presenting key findings from a national study that was undertaken to investigate the role and responsibilities of midwives and to identify continuing educational need. The background to the study and the titles of the other papers in the series have been outlined in the first paper. Issues related to the way midwifery care is organized nationally are discussed in this paper. Midwives and supervisors indicated a strong commitment to providing woman-centred care in a caring and sensitive manner, often in the face of enormous structural and organizational change. This paper addresses key issues that arose for midwives and supervisors when planning and providing an optimum quality service.

Aspects of care 4: views of professionals and mothers

This is the fourth in a series of six papers presenting key findings from a national study that was undertaken to investigate the role and responsibilities of midwives and to identify continuing educational need. The background to the study and the titles of the other papers in the series have been outlined in the first paper. This paper focuses on midwives’, supervisors’, doctors’ and mothers’ views regarding quality of care issues, with particular emphasis on what makes a ‘good’ midwife.

Woman-centred care

Changes over the past decade have emphasised the individual service user and their relationship with the health service. Within the maternity services this has been interpreted as woman-centred care a result of key initiatives; the Winterton Report (House of Commons, 1992. Maternity Services. Second Report of the Health Committee (Winterton Report), Vol. 1. HMSO, London) and Changing Childbirth (DoH, 1993a, Changing childbirth: reports of the expert maternity group parts 1 & 2. HMSO, London). Changing Childbirth outlined key principles of the maternity services and the need for the woman (and her partner, if she wishes) to be the focus of care. The key principles are choice, continuity and control. High quality care depends on the recognition of individuals as having unique needs which continues to be reflected within contemporary policy documents (DoH, 1997, The new NHS: modern and dependable. HMSO, London). This paper presents findings related to the provision of woman-centred care from a national research and development study. The study design incorporated (i): a national survey which was undertaken with midwives, midwife supervisors and doctors; and (ii): in-depth case studies in which information was obtained through interviews with midwives, midwife supervisors, educators, managers, doctors and mothers. Midwives, at all levels, are involved in changing maternity service provision and adapting to new systems of care which aim to increase continuity of care and carer for the woman. The researchers sought to understand how woman-centred care was interpreted and experienced in practice. The findings have been used to identify the continuing educational needs of midwives, and to develop an open learning educational package to meet identified need. The curriculum was designed to enhance the move towards the provision of a more integrated woman-centred service.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.