Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Direct entry: equipped for competence?

The effectiveness of direct-entry midwifery education has been the subject of much debate. This paper describes a study comparing perceptions of competence among midwives educated on direct-entry and post-registration programmes.

Tied to the job: affective and relational components of nurse retention

Paper investigates whether affective and relational components of nurses' experience of work have a significant impact on their intentions to leave either the job or the nursing profession in models that control for other factors (sociodemographic, work conditions, perceptions of quality of care) that are known to affect career decisions. [Abridged Abstract]

Trust and Leadership in Higher Education in the Downturn

This Leadership Academy Workshop presentation focused on 'Trust and Leadership in the Downturn', with particular reference to the public sector and to education. The presentation discussed a range of definitions of trust, including the view of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) that trust can be described as 'the willingness of a person to be vulnerable to the actions of another, based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that action'. The presentation then focused on the reasons why this relational psychological state is important,particularly in an economic recession when people were facing job cuts and economic uncertainty in a wider political and social environment characterised by cynicism and a downturn in trust. If trust is defined in part as a belief in the honesty, competence and benevolence of others, it tends to act like 'social glue', cushioning difficult situations and enabling actions to take place easily that otherwise would not be permissible. A worrying state of affairs has recently been developing across the world, however, in the economic downturn, as reported in the Edelman Trust Barometer for 2009, in which there was a marked diminuition of trust in corporations, businesses and government, as a result of the credit crunch. While the US and parts of Europe was showing recovery from a generalised loss of trust by mid-year 2009, the UK had not. It seems that social attitudes in Britain may be hardening - it seems that from being a nation of sceptics we may be becoming a nation of cynics: for example, 69% of the population surveyed by Edelman trust the government less than six months ago. In this situation, there is a need to promote positive measures to build trust, including the establishment of more transparent and honest business practices and practices to ensure that employees are treated well. Following the presentation, a workshop was held to discuss the nature of a possible loss of trust in the downturn in the UK and its implications for leadership practices and development.