Bridging the gap with teamwork: collaborative leadership for communities of practice in the learning and skills sector

Collaborative approaches in leadership and management are increasingly acknowledged to play a key role in successful institutions in the learning and skills sector (LSS) (Ofsted, 2004). Such approaches may be important in bridging the potential 'distance' (psychological, cultural, interactional and geographical) (Collinson, 2005) that may exist between 'leaders' and 'followers', fostering more democratic communal solidarity. This paper reports on a 2006-07 research project funded by the Centre for Excellence in Leadership (CEL) that aimed to collect and analyse data on 'collaborative leadership' (CL) in the learning and skills sector. The project investigated collaborative leadership and its potential for benefiting staff through trust and knowledge-sharing in communities of practice (CoPs). The project forms part of longer-term educational research investigating leadership in a collaborative inquiry process (Jameson et al., 2006). The research examined the potential for CL to benefit institutions, analysing respondents' understanding of and resistance to collaborative practices. Quantitative and qualitative data from senior managers and lecturers was analysed using electronic data in SPSS and Tropes Zoom. The project aimed to recommend systems and practices for more inclusive, diverse leadership (Lumby et al., 2005). Collaborative leadership has increasingly gained international prominence as emphasis shifted towards team leadership beyond zero-sum 'leadership'/ 'followership' polarities into more mature conceptions of shared leadership spaces, within which synergistic leadership spaces can be mediated. The relevance of collaboration within the LSS has been highlighted following a spate of recent government-driven policy developments in FE. The promotion of CL addresses concerns about the apparent 'remoteness' of some senior managers, and the 'neo-management' control of professionals which can increase 'distance' between leaders and 'followers' and may de-professionalise staff in an already disempowered sector. Positive benefit from 'collaborative advantage' tends to be assumed in idealistic interpretations of CL, but potential 'collaborative inertia' may be problematic in a sector characterised by rapid top-down policy changes and continuous external audit and surveillance. Constant pressure for achievement against goals leaves little time for democratic group negotiations, despite the desires of leaders to create a more collaborative ethos. Yet prior models of intentional communities of practice potentially offer promise for CL practice to improve group performance despite multiple constraints. The CAMEL CoP model (JISC infoNet, 2006) was linked to the project, providing one practical way of implementing CL within situated professional networks.The project found that a good understanding of CL was demonstrated by most respondents, who thought it could enable staff to share power and work in partnership to build trust and conjoin skills, abilities and experience to achieve common goals for the good of the sector. However, although most respondents expressed agreement with the concept and ideals of CL, many thought this was currently an idealistically democratic, unachievable pipe dream in the LSS. Many respondents expressed concerns with the 'audit culture' and authoritarian management structures in FE. While there was a strong desire to see greater levels of implementation of CL, and 'collaborative advantage' from the 'knowledge sharing benefit potential' of team leadership, respondents also strongly advised against the pitfalls of 'collaborative inertia'. A 'distance' between senior leadership views and those of staff lower down the hierarchy regarding aspects of leadership performance in the sector was reported. Finally, the project found that more research is needed to investigate CL and develop innovative methods of practical implementation within autonomous communities of professional practice.

Part-time and fractional staff in the learning and skills sector

This Universities and College Union Launch Event presentation reported on the findings of Learning and Skills Research Network (LSRN) London and South East (LSE) Regional Research Project. The presentation reflected on research carried out during 2002-06 on the development and deployment of part-time staff in the Learning and Skills Sector. Although the lifelong learning sector is the largest UK education sector, little attention has as yet been paid to the role of LSC sector part-time staff. Worrying trends of an increasing casualisation of staffing have been reported. The role of part-timers as highly committed (philanthropic) but generally underpaid and exploited staff (ragged-trousered) emerged from the data collected by this investigation, which examined the role of part-timers in several colleges and adult education institutions in London and the South East. The metaphor of the 'ragged-trousered philanthropist' was consciously selected to investigate the interactivity between philantrophy, employment practices for PT staff, and education as social action, in addressing the need for good practice to achieve quality outcomes in learning and teaching. The results are to some extent transferable to other education and training sectors employing part-time staff, e.g. higher education institutions and work-based training organisations.

Water privatisation

The article examines the expansion of private water companies since 1989 the withdrawal from developing countries from 2003 onwards, and the economic impact of privatisation. The analysis is set in the context of the historical development of water services in the north and the south, showing that the role of private water companies since the start of the 20th century has been historically limited and exceptional. The impact of water privatisation is considered in relation to the issues of investment, prices, and efficiency, drawing on empirical evidence from the north and developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Particular attention is given to France and the UK, where private water companies, for different reasons, are most established. The evidence from both north and south shows systematic underinvestment, monopoly pricing, regulatory gaming, and no significant efficiency differences between public and private sector operators. In conclusion, the article identifies institutional policies including fiscal constraints and lending conditionalities as key drivers of privatisation, and questions whether these can sustain privatisation in the water sector where historical experience indicates it is an inappropriate solution.

Profitability and the poor: corporate strategies, innovation and sustainability

Based on empirical evidence, the article looks at the implications of private sector participation (PSP) for the delivery of water supply and sanitation to the urban and peri-urban poor in developing countries, with particular reference to Africa and Latin America. More precisely, the article addresses the impact produced by multinational companies’ (MNCs) strategies, in light of the pursuit of profitability, on the extension of connections to the pipeline network. It does so by questioning the assumptions that greater private sector efficiency and innovation, together with contract design, will enable the sustainable extension of service coverage to low income dwellers. The strategies of the major water MNCs are considered both in relation to the global expansion of their operations and the adjustment of local strategies to commercial considerations. The latter might result in identifying proWtable markets, modifying contractual provisions, attempting to reduce costs and increase income, reducing risks and exiting from non-performing contracts. The evidence reviewed allows for re-assessing the relative roles of the public and private sectors in extending and delivering water services to the poor. First, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity than from MNCs. Secondly, whenever MNCs are liable to exit from non-profitable contracts, the public sector has no other option than to deal with external risks aVecting continuity of provision. Finally, market limitations affecting MNCs’ ability to serve marginal populations and access cheap capital do not apply to well-organised, politically led public sector undertakings