Can evidence-based healthy housing interventions be put into practice in the UK's private housing sector?

The UK’s public health agenda has encouraged enhanced housing and health interventions. The private housing sector (privately rented and owner occupied) is the favoured and majority UK tenure, but is it seen as a primarily health promoting environment, or a commercial asset? There has been a growing interest in integrating health and housing policy in recent years. However, housing and public health fall under separate government departments and funding regimes. Partnership working has sought to overcome silo working and encourage evidence-based practice, yet is particularly challenging for interventions in the private housing sector, with an increased emphasis on ‘personal responsibility’ for conditions. Strategic public health frameworks are in place, but barriers remain and there is pressure for organisations to revert to core activities. An accessible, continually updated evidence base specific to private sector housing is recommended, to help estimate health gain arising from interventions to prioritise activities and address inequalities.

Reviews: Private Passions with Robin Wilson [Radio review]

Tony Mann reviews Robin Wilson's appearance as Michael Berkeley's guest on Private Passions. Broadcast on BBC Radio 3, on 9 September 2007.

Private purpose trusts: a reform proposal

Argues for the introduction of statutory reform to enable valid private purpose trusts to be created by those wishing to make testamentary gifts for non-charitable purposes, with no human beneficiary. Examines the rationale employed in cases where the validity of a private purpose trust has been upheld despite the absence of a human beneficiary. Considers the approaches adopted by five offshore jurisdictions when introducing purpose trust legislation. Identifies key features to be included in any new purpose trust legislation introduced in the UK.

Showing interest

Comments on the Chancery Division judgment in Jones v Kernott on the beneficial interests of former cohabiting partners in their family home. Considers whether the partners must have intended to vary their shares when the man stopped paying the mortgage, bought a house in his own name and went to live there. Discusses whether the court could take into account what was considered fair between the partners based on the whole course of dealing, including non-payment of maintenance for children.

The private sector in water in 2009

A critical survey of the impact on public water of water multinationals, local private companies, and water-consuming multinationals.

A crisis for public-private partnerships (PPPs)?

The credit squeeze and recession are combining to make PPPs almost impossible to finance, anywhere in the world. Traditional government borrowing and procurement can still be used to implement infrastructure programmes.

Private equity, productivity and earnings

A detailed study in the USA shows that workers experience a relative fall in earnings after a takeover by private equity. Also, companies bought by private equity are at great risk of defaulting on their debts in the next 2 years.

Thinking inside the box: the World Bank position on the private and public sector

An analysis of how the World Bank has maintained a position supportive of mutlinational strategies for privatisation of water. (Brief version).

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) summary paper

The summary of three reports on PPPs in Europe, including a critical overview, a study of alternatives, and a study on the protection of working conditions, in the context of EU law on procurement and other subjects.

Private equity and employment - the Davos/WEF/Harvard study

The World Economic Forum at Davos has published a major study showing that workplaces of firms taken over by private equity have 10% less employees 5 years after the takeover, than other similar workplaces. The rate of plant closures, opening, acquisitions and disposals is twice as high as in other firms, and the net effect is still a job loss of 3.6%-4.5% after only 2 years, compared with other firms. Firms taken over by private equity are also more likely to go bankrupt than publicly quoted firms.

Private equity: financial investors, public services, and employment

The report surveys the activity of private equity and other financial investors in the water, waste and healthcare sectors in Europe. It includes the appraisal of a WEF study on employment effects.

More public rescues for more private finance failures - a critique of the EC Communication on PPPs

A critique of the EC Communication on PPPs, challenging the scale of state aid offered to PPPs, the role of PPPs in the economic recovery strategy for the EU, and drawing attention to the damage done to public authorities by 'innovative' financing mechanisms.