From ALIBI to COLUMBUS. The long march to self-aware, reflective computational models of humor

One thing is (a) to develop a system that handles some task to one's satisfaction, and also has a universally recognized myrthful side to its output. Another thing is (b) to provide an analysis of why you are getting such a byproduct. Yet another thing is (c) to develop a model that incorporates reflection about some phenomenon in humor for its own sake. This paper selects for discussion especially Alibi, going on to describe the preliminaries of Columbus. The former, which fits in (a), is a planner with an explanatory capability. It invents pretexts. It's no legal defense, but it is relevant to evidential thinking in AI & Law. Some of the output pretext are myrthful. Not in the sense they are silly: they are not. A key factor seems to be the very alacrity at explaining out detail after detail of globally damning evidence. I attempt a reanalysis of Alibi in respect of (b). As to Columbus, it fits instead in (c). We introduce here the basics of this (unimplemented) model, developed to account for a sample text in parody.

Representing temporal knowledge in legal discourse

This paper presents a formalism for representing temporal knowledge in legal discourse that allows an explicit expression of time and event occurrences. The fundamental time structure is characterized as a well‐ordered discrete set of primitive times, i.e. non‐decomposable intervals with positive duration or points with zero duration), from which decomposable intervals can be constructed. The formalism supports a full representation of both absolute and relative temporal knowledge, and a formal mechanism for checking the temporal consistency of a given set of legal statements is provided. The general consistency checking algorithm which addresses both absolute and relative temporal knowledge turns out to be a linear programming problem, while in the special case where only relative temporal relations are involved, it becomes a simple question of searching for cycles in the graphical representation of the corresponding legal text.

The Jama legal narrative. Part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, we reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: "The Jama Model. On Legal Narratives and Interpretation Patterns"), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story, is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability was infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for AI researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flouishing among legal scholars. Nowadays both the the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and Bayesioskeptics (e.g. Ron Allen) among those legal scholars whoare involved in the controversy are willing to give AI researchers a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application or probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making (Rosoni 1995). Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

[Book Review] Noel Starkey (ed), Connectionist Natural Language Processing: Readings from 'Connection Science'

Review of: Noel Starkey (ed), Connectionist Natural Language Processing: Readings from 'Connection Science'

Kappa calculus and evidential strength: A note on Åqvist's logical theory of legal evidence

Lennart Åqvist (1992) proposed a logical theory of legal evidence, based on the Bolding-Ekelöf of degrees of evidential strength. This paper reformulates Åqvist's model in terms of the probabilistic version of the kappa calculus. Proving its acceptability in the legal context is beyond the present scope, but the epistemological debate about Bayesian Law isclearly relevant. While the present model is a possible link to that lineof inquiry, we offer some considerations about the broader picture of thepotential of AI & Law in the evidentiary context. Whereas probabilisticreasoning is well-researched in AI, calculations about the threshold ofpersuasion in litigation, whatever their value, are just the tip of theiceberg. The bulk of the modeling desiderata is arguably elsewhere, if one isto ideally make the most of AI's distinctive contribution as envisaged forlegal evidence research.

[Book review] Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts

Review of: Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts. Ray Bull and David Carson (eds.) Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.

Acknowledgement [Special Issue - Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence]

This Acknowledgement refers to the special issue "Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence" of the Artificial Intelligence and Law, September 2001, Vol. 9, Issue 2-3, which was guest edited by Ephraim Nissan.

Editorial: context, content and aims [Special Issue - Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence]

This special issue "Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence" of the Artificial Intelligence and Law, September 2001, Vol. 9, Issue 2-3, which was guest edited by Ephraim Nissan.

The Jama legal narrative part I: The JAMA Model and narrative interpretation patterns

For the purposes of starting to tackle, within artificial intelligence (AI), the narrative aspects of legal narratives in a criminal evidence perspective, traditional AI models of narrative understanding can arguably supplement extant models of legal narratives from the scholarly literature of law, jury studies, or the semiotics of law. Not only: the literary (or cinematic) models prominent in a given culture impinge, with their poetic conventions, on the way members of the culture make sense of the world. This shows glaringly in the sample narrative from the Continent-the Jama murder, the inquiry, and the public outcry-we analyse in this paper. Apparently in the same racist crime category as the case of Stephen Lawrence's murder (in Greenwich on 22 April 1993) with the ensuing still current controversy in the UK, the Jama case (some 20 years ago) stood apart because of a very unusual element: the eyewitnesses identifying the suspects were a group of football referees and linesmen eating together at a restaurant, and seeing the sleeping man as he was set ablaze in a public park nearby. Professional background as witnesses-cum-factfinders in a mass sport, and public perceptions of their required characteristics, couldn't but feature prominently in the public perception of the case, even more so as the suspects were released by the magistrate conducting the inquiry. There are sides to this case that involve different expected effects in an inquisitorial criminal procedure system from the Continent, where an investigating magistrate leads the inquiry and prepares the prosecution case, as opposed to trial by jury under the Anglo-American adversarial system. In the JAMA prototype, we tried to approach the given case from the coign of vantage of narrative models from AI.

The Jama legal narrative part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches, which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, I reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: 'The JAMA Model and Narrative Interpretation Patterns'), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability were infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially Bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flourishing among legal scholars; nowadays both the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and the Bayesio-skeptics (e.g. Ron Allen), among those legal scholars who are involved in the controversy, are willing to give AI research a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application of probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making. Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

A policy-definition language and prototype implementation library for policy-based autonomic systems

This paper presents work towards generic policy toolkit support for autonomic computing systems in which the policies themselves can be adapted dynamically and automatically. The work is motivated by three needs: the need for longer-term policy-based adaptation where the policy itself is dynamically adapted to continually maintain or improve its effectiveness despite changing environmental conditions; the need to enable non autonomics-expert practitioners to embed self-managing behaviours with low cost and risk; and the need for adaptive policy mechanisms that are easy to deploy into legacy code. A policy definition language is presented; designed to permit powerful expression of self-managing behaviours. The language is very flexible through the use of simple yet expressive syntax and semantics, and facilitates a very diverse policy behaviour space through both hierarchical and recursive uses of language elements. A prototype library implementation of the policy support mechanisms is described. The library reads and writes policies in well-formed XML script. The implementation extends the state of the art in policy-based autonomics through innovations which include support for multiple policy versions of a given policy type, multiple configuration templates, and meta-policies to dynamically select between policy instances and templates. Most significantly, the scheme supports hot-swapping between policy instances. To illustrate the feasibility and generalised applicability of these tools, two dissimilar example deployment scenarios are examined. The first is taken from an exploratory implementation of self-managing parallel processing, and is used to demonstrate the simple and efficient use of the tools. The second example demonstrates more-advanced functionality, in the context of an envisioned multi-policy stock trading scheme which is sensitive to environmental volatility

The AGILE policy expression language for autonomic systems

This paper presents the AGILE policy expression language. The language enables powerful expression of self-managing behaviours and facilitates policy-based autonomic computing in which the policies themselves can be adapted dynamically and automatically. The language is generic so as to be deployable across a wide spectrum of application domains, and is very flexible through the use of simple yet expressive syntax and semantics. The development of AGILE is motivated by the need for adaptive policy mechanisms that are easy to deploy into legacy code and can be used by non autonomics-expert practitioners to embed self-managing behaviours with low cost and risk. A library implementation of the policy language is described. The implementation extends the state of the art in policy-based autonomics through innovations which include support for multiple policy versions of a given policy type, multiple configuration templates, and higher-level ‘meta-policies’ to dynamically select between differently configured business-logic policy instances and templates. Two dissimilar example deployment scenarios are examined.