‘Martial races’ and ‘imperial subjects’: violence and governance in colonial India, 1857–1914

This essay explores the specificity of colonial violence in India. Although imperial and military historians are familiar with several instances of such violence—notably the rebellion in 1857 and the 1919 massacre at the Jallianwalla Bagh in Amritsar—there is a broader, and arguably more significant, history that has largely escaped attention. In contrast to metropolitan European states, where sovereignty derived, at least in principle, from a covenant between subjects and government, the sovereign power of the colonial state was always predicated on the violent subjugation of ‘the natives’. However, while violence was integral to colonialism, such violence was never a purely metropolitan agency: most of those recruited to serve in the colonial military were, themselves, Indian. Exploring the history of the imperial military in South Asia after 1857, the paper outlines the complex and rather ambiguous relationship between the colonial state and its ‘native armies’. RESUME Cet article se penche sur la spe´cificite´ de la violence coloniale. Malgre´ des exemples familiers—comme la grande re´volte de 1857 en Inde ou le massacre de Jallianwalla Bagh a` Amritsar en 1919—il y a une histoire plus large et plus importante qui a e´chappe´e a` l’attention des historiens. Contrairement aux e´tats europe´ens ou la souverainete´ de´rivait en principe du moins d’un contrat social entre les acteurs sociaux, le pouvoir souverain de l’e´tat colonial restait fonde´ sur la subjugation violente des indige`nes.

When deterrence works - and when it doesn't: a comparison of Sweden's prostitution law and UK's Dangerous Dogs Act

Many pieces of legislation have been implemented with the anticipation - or justification - that they will have a deterrent effect. Deterrence was clearly argued in the debate preceding the Swedish prostitution law prohibiting the purchase of sexual services, but less so regarding the Dangerous Dogs Act, which was a very rapid response to a particular moral panic. As it turned out, the Swedish law has had a deterrent effect on street prostitution in that 'respectable' buyers were deterred. It will be argued that it is this very 'respectability' that makes deterrence work in this case. Regarding the Dangerous Dogs Act, the owners of Pit Bulls and other banned breeds are not considered 'respectable' and the banning might have had the reversed effect - increasing the attraction of these dogs, rather than deterring the ownership. Apart from deterrence and its consequences, the rendering invisible of key actors - buyers and owners respectively - and the use of symbolic legislation to promote moral messages will also be considered. [From the Author]