Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

The performance and persistence of exchange-traded funds: evidence for iShares MSCI country-specific ETFs

The aim of this paper is to investigate the performance and persistence of 20 iShares MSCI country-specific exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in comparison with S&P 500 index over the period July 2001 to June 2006. There are several studies analysing mutual funds performance in past years, but very little is known about ETFs. In our analysis the Sharpe, Treynor and Sortino ratios are used as risk-adjusted performance measures. To evaluate performance persistence and therefore if there is any relationship among past performance and future performance, we apply to the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient and the Winner-loser Contingency Table. The main findings are at two levels. First, ETFs can beat the U.S. market index based on risk-adjusted performance measures. Second, there is evidence of ETFs performance persistence based on annual return.

Strategies for water pollution control in Dhaka, Bangladesh: an institutional and economic analysis

This paper presents primary data based on research carried out as part of a large World Bank project. Results from our survey show that water pollution in Dhaka watershed has reached alarming levels and is posing significant threats to health and economic activity, particularly among the poor and vulnerable. Rice productivity in the watershed area, for example, has declined by 40% in recent years and vegetable cultivation in the riverbeds has been severely damaged. We also found significant correlation between water pollution and diseases such as jaundice, diarrhoea and skin problems. It was reported that the cost of treatment of skin diseases for one episode could be as high as 29% of the weekly earnings of poor households. Given the magnitude of the contamination problem, a multi-agent stakeholder approach was necessary to analyse the institutional and economic constraints that would need to be addressed in order to improve environmental management. This approach, in turn, enabled core strategies to be developed. The strategies were better understood around three types of actors in industrial pollution, i.e. (1) principal actors, who contribute directly to industrial pollution; (2) stakeholders, who exacerbate the situation by inaction; and (3) the potential actors in mitigation of water contamination. Within a carrot-and-stick framework, nine strategies leading to the strengthening of environmental management were explored. They aim at improving governance and transparency within public agencies and private industry through the setting up of incentive structures to advance compliance and enforcement of environmental standards. Civil society and the population at large are, on the other hand, encouraged to contribute actively to the mitigation of water pollution by improving the management of environmental information and by raising public awareness.

Infrastructure, the crisis, and pension funds

Infrastructure investment has been an important element in the economic stimulus packages introduced to try and deal with the effects of the recession. It is reinforced by the need to develop sustainable energy sources, and by the development needs of countries in the south. Public sector finance – tax revenues and bonds – remain the main way of financing such investment. The use of PPP projects to finance and operate infrastructure services, and the development of infrastructure funds as a way of investing in them, are both dangerous and unnecessary.