7 resultados para directors’ liabilities
em Greenwich Academic Literature Archive - UK
Resumo:
The guidance was commissioned from Dr Amina Memon and Lynn Hulse at Aberdeen University. Their work was overseen by a steering group with representatives from the Scottish Executive Justice Department, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, NCH Scotland, the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, the Association of Directors of Social Work, the Law Society for Scotland, the Scottish Association of Community Child Health and the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration. A full list of those involved is given in the Appendix C. pt. 1. Guidance on interviewing child witnesses in Scotland -- pt. 2. Guidance on the questioning of children in court -- pt. 3. Lord Justice-General's memorandum on child witnesses: appendix to Guidance on the questioning of children in court -- pt. 4. Guidance on child witness court familiarisation visits -- pt. 5. Information about child, young and vulnerable adult witnesses to inform decision-making in the legal process: good practice guide -- pt. 6. Code of practice to facilitate the provision of therapeutic support to child witnesses in court proceedings -- pt. 7. Guidance on the conduct of identity parades with child witnesses.
Resumo:
This paper explores the spatial conceptualisation of the themes of diaspora, displacement and desire in cinema, particularly in the work of Nuri Bilge Ceylan (Uzak) , Fatih Akin (Gegen Die Wand) and Michael Winterbottom (Code 46). All three directors explore the imagined cinematic city as a site of multiple (un)belongings and interrogate how notions of identity are displaced and disrupted by geopolitics, by the city and by cinema itself. Both Ceylan and Akin’s visions of Istanbul are haunted by Beyoglu, both as the site of Istanbul’s contemporary cultural regeneration and by unspoken histories repressed by the Republic’s offical rhetoric of Turkish identity. In contrast Akin and Winterbottom’s heterotopias of the hotel and the hospital provide possible metaphors for these dislocated global identities. This paper will engage with a series of questions. What is the (imagined) place created between the viewer and the screen, or is it a non-place? Do the identities/ memories created there produce a ‘third space’? This paper uses Winnicot, Soja and Bhabha to ask what that third space might be and its consequences for a contemporary global Turkish identity. If these films depict a (Freudian) screen memory of dislocated subjectivities then what is being suppressed and sutured?
Resumo:
In the early 19th century the London Missionary Society’s activities in South Africa were the subject of great scandal and a source of disrepute. The behaviour and attitudes of the first wave of LMS missionaries had challenged, and caused outrage, to both the political and moral norms of the colony. The radical attitudes and unconventional private lives of many of the early missionaries had also clearly shocked the Directors in Europe. In these controversies, and in the manner that the Society dealt with them, there can be read a contestation about not only the character, but also the purpose of mission activity. Was the Missionary task to work for political stability, to spread European values and help prepare a compliant and educated workforce? Or was it to save ‘lost souls’ and turn people away from idolatry and sin? Or, again, was it to fight for the oppressed, to liberate slaves and oppose tyranny? These debates were framed in complex and contradictory ways by a larger discussion that was informed by the new ideas and agendas that had emerged in the 18th century, commonly referred to as ‘The Enlightenment’. This paper traces the contours of an engagement between ‘Evangelical’ values and ‘Enlightenment’ principles through an exploration of the issues of the day such as: abolitionism, women’s rights, civilization and savagery. [From the Author]
Resumo:
[Introduction] When a director of one company at the same time serves on the board of another company, the two companies are said to be interlocked by that director. Through this linkage each company has potential access to information about the activities of the other, either explicitly as intelligence transferred by the director or implicitly in shaping the director’s perspective and general views. Director interlocks formed by executive directors, employed by the firm, are generally interpreted as more instrumental for the firm than those formed by non-executive directors. Firms are often interlocked with more than one other firm and those firms, in turn, with others; a web of social relationships envelops business.
Resumo:
The extensive array of interlocking directorate research remains near-exclusively cross-sectional or comparative cross-sectional in nature. While this has been fruitful in identifying persistent structures of inter-organisational relationships evidence of the impact of these structures on organisational performance or activity has been more limited. This should not be surprising because, by their nature, relationships have strong longitudinal and dynamic qualities that are likely to be difficult to isolate through cross-sectional approaches. Clearly, managerial practice is inevitably strongly conditioned by the specific contingencies of the time and the information available through networks of colleagues and advisers (particularly at board level) at the time. But managerial and directoral capabilities and mental sets are also developed over time, particularly through previous experiences in these roles and the formation of long-lasting 'strong' and 'weak' relationships. This paper tests the influence of three longitudinal dimensions of managers and directors' relationships on a set of indicators of financial performance, drawing from a large dataset of detailing historic board membership of UK firms. It finds evidence of isomorphic processes through these channels and establishes that the longitudinal design considerably enhances the detection of performance effects from directorate interlocks. More broadly, the research has implications for the conception of collective action and the constitution of 'community'.
Resumo:
The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.
Resumo:
[Book Contents] Introducing Employee Reward Systems; Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks; The Legal, Employment Relations and Market Context; Base Pay Structures and Relationships; Pay Setting, Composition and Progression; Variable Pay Schemes; Benefits; Pensions; Non-Financial Reward; Rewarding Directors and Executives; International Reward Management; Employee Reward within HRM.