The legal pendulum swings back

Comments on the Court of Appeal judgment in Abou-Rahmah v Abacha on liability for dishonest assistance to a breach of trust. Discusses whether an objective standard should apply to determine whether the accessory acted dishonestly. Reviews case law, examining whether the combined test proposed in the House of Lords judgment in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley is still good law.

Back to the bad old days?

Reviews the Court of Appeal decision in James v Thomas that a cohabitee had not acquired an equitable interest in a property registered in her former partner's sole name through a constructive trust, based on express or inferred common intention, or by proprietary estoppel. Highlights the inconsistent approach of the courts to cohabitee disputes. Outlines the Law Commission's proposals in its 2007 report, Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown, notes the factors to be taken into account by the courts, and speculates on the case's outcome if the proposals were applied. [From Legal Journals Index]

Undue influence: back door tactics?

Implications of CA decision on whether it was abuse of process for bank to pursue remedy against mortgagor by suing on personal covenant which could result in bankruptcy following successful defence of possession proceedings by wife. [From Legal Journals Index]

Lost in Translation, book review of Urban Landscape Perspectives

In Sofia Coppola's 2003 film Lost in Translation, Bill Murray and Scarlett Johansson's characters find themselves culturally stranded and oddly mismatched as an improvised tourist couple in contemporary Tokyo. This is an urban landscape that they cannot comprehend but only temporarily experience, in a fragmented and surreptitious way that allows no possible understanding and categorizations, but offers physical inclusion, emotional participation and momentary embeddedness.

Two steps forward, one step back: developing the curriculum for training teachers for technical and further education England 1945-1956

This paper discusses the development of provision for the training of teachers in English further and technical education from 1945 to 1956. While these years saw little growth in this provision, they were formative in that the institutional and curricular patterns of teacher training for the diverse fields of technical and further education were developed at this time. The work of the three national centres in Bolton, London and Huddersfield, during the period of the Emergency Training Scheme (ETS) is summarised with particular reference to the influence of the Ministry of Education‟s conditions for ETS colleges and courses. With the ending of the ETS in 1951 the three centres were given permanent status as teacher training colleges which in turn brought them into association with their local universities as constituent colleges of their Area Training Organisations. The consequences of this transfer to the universities for the curriculum and assessment of technical teacher training and the 'policy dichotomy' of teacher training for secondary and technical education are examined.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Slicing issues in CAD translation to STL in rapid prototyping

The rapid prototyping (RP) process is being used widely with great potential for rapid manufacturing of functional parts. The RP process involves translation of the CAD file to STL format followed by slicing of the model into multiple horizontal layers, each of which is reproduced physically in making the prototype. The thickness of the resulting slices has a profound effect on the surface finish and build time of the prototype. The purpose of this paper is to show the effects of slice thickness on the surface finish, layering error, and build time of a prototype, as well as to show how an efficient STL file can be developed. Three objects were modeled and STL files were generated. One STL file for each object was sliced using different slice thicknesses, and the build times were obtained. Screenshots were used to show the slicing effect on layering error and surface finish and to demonstrate the means to a more efficient STL file. From the results, it is clear that the surface finish and build time are important factors that are affected by slice thickness