A multi-scale atomistic-continuum modelling of crack propagation in a two-dimensional macroscopic plate

A novel multi-scale seamless model of brittle-crack propagation is proposed and applied to the simulation of fracture growth in a two-dimensional Ag plate with macroscopic dimensions. The model represents the crack propagation at the macroscopic scale as the drift-diffusion motion of the crack tip alone. The diffusive motion is associated with the crack-tip coordinates in the position space, and reflects the oscillations observed in the crack velocity following its critical value. The model couples the crack dynamics at the macroscales and nanoscales via an intermediate mesoscale continuum. The finite-element method is employed to make the transition from the macroscale to the nanoscale by computing the continuum-based displacements of the atoms at the boundary of an atomic lattice embedded within the plate and surrounding the tip. Molecular dynamics (MD) simulation then drives the crack tip forward, producing the tip critical velocity and its diffusion constant. These are then used in the Ito stochastic calculus to make the reverse transition from the nanoscale back to the macroscale. The MD-level modelling is based on the use of a many-body potential. The model successfully reproduces the crack-velocity oscillations, roughening transitions of the crack surfaces, as well as the macroscopic crack trajectory. The implications for a 3-D modelling are discussed.

Multiscale numerical modelling of crack propagation in two-dimensional metal plate

A novel multiscale model of brittle crack propagation in an Ag plate with macroscopic dimensions has been developed. The model represents crack propagation as stochastic drift-diffusion motion of the crack tip atom through the material, and couples the dynamics across three different length scales. It integrates the nanomechanics of bond rupture at the crack tip with the displacement and stress field equations of continuum based fracture theories. The finite element method is employed to obtain the continuum based displacement and stress fields over the macroscopic plate, and these are then used to drive the crack tip forward at the atomic level using the molecular dynamics simulation method based on many-body interatomic potentials. The linkage from the nanoscopic scale back to the macroscopic scale is established via the Ito stochastic calculus, the stochastic differential equation of which advances the tip to a new position on the macroscopic scale using the crack velocity and diffusion constant obtained on the nanoscale. Well known crack characteristics, such as the roughening transitions of the crack surfaces, crack velocity oscillations, as well as the macroscopic crack trajectories, are obtained.

Low temperature X-ray crystallographic structures of two lamotrigine analogues: (I) 2-methyl,3-amino, 5-imino-6-(2,3-dichlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine water solvate and (II) 2-methyl,3,5-diamino-6-(2,3-dichlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine isethionate, hemi-hydrate

The X-ray crystal structures of two lamotrigine derivatives (I) 2-methyl, 3-amino, 5-imino-6-(2, 3-dichlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine, C10H9Cl2N5, as the hemi hydrate and (II) 2-methyl,3,5-diamino-6-(2,3-dichlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine, C10H10Cl2N5, as the isethionate-water solvate, have been carried out at liquid nitrogen temperature. A detailed comparison of the two structures is given. Both are monoclinic and centrosymmetric, with (I) in space group C2/c, and (II) in space group P2(1)/n. For (I) the unit cell dimensions are a = 19.5466(10), b = 7.5483(4), c = 15.7861(8) angstrom, beta = 91.458(3)degrees, volume = 2328.4(2) angstrom(3), Z = 8, density = 1.590 Mg/m(3); for (II). For (II) the unit cell dimensions are a = 6.0566(2), b = 11.0084(4) c = 23.9973(9) angstrom, beta = 92.587(3)degrees, volume = 1598.35(10) angstrom(3), Z = 4, density = 1.597 Mg/m(3). For (I) final R indices [I > 2sigma(I)] are R1 = 0.0356, wR2 = 0.0782 and R indices (all data) are R1 = 0.0424, wR2 = 0.0817. For (II) final R indices [I > 2sigma(I)] are R1 = 0.0380, wR2 = 0.0871 and R indices (all data) R1 = 0.0558, wR2 = 0.0949. Both structures have a molecule of water of crystallization and (II) also includes a solvated CH3SO3. Comparisons are made between the two structures. Structure (I) is very unusual in having a = NH group at position C5' on the triazine ring. No other examples of this particular substitution, which is usually -NH2, have been reported.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.