Industrial water pollution in Dhaka, Bangladesh: strategies and incentives for pollution control in small and medium enterprises

The extent and gravity of the environmental degradation of the water resources in Dhaka due to untreated industrial waste is not fully recognised in international discourse. Pollution levels affect vast numbers, but the poor and the vulnerable are the worst affected. For example, rice productivity, the mainstay of poor farmers, in the Dhaka watershed has declined by 40% over a period of ten years. The study found significant correlations between water pollution and diseases such as jaundice, diarrhoea and skin problems. It was reported that the cost of treatment of one episode of skin disease could be as high as 29% of the weekly earnings of some of the poorest households. The dominant approach to deal with pollution in the SMEs is technocratic. Given the magnitude of the problem this paper argues that to control industrial pollution by SMEs and to enhance their compliance it is necessary to move from the technocratic approach to one which can also address the wider institutional and attitudinal issues. Underlying this shift is the need to adopt the appropriate methodology. The multi-stakeholder analysis enables an understanding of the actors, their influence, their capacity to participate in, or oppose change, and the existing and embedded incentive structures which allow them to pursue interests which are generally detrimental to environmental good. This enabled core and supporting strategies to be developed around three types of actors in industrial pollution, i.e., (i) principal actors, who directly contribute to industrial pollution; (ii) stakeholders who exacerbate the situation; and (iii) potential actors in mitigation. Within a carrot-and-stick framework, the strategies aim to improve environmental governance and transparency, set up a packet to incentive for industry and increase public awareness.

Financing of SME's: an asset side story

The main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information (cost of gathering and analysing information) and transactions costs associated with non-payment (costs of collecting and selling collateral). According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME's confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.