The varieties of student experience - an open research question and some ways to answer it

Based on meetings of the Society for Research into Higher Education’s Student Experience Network over the past three years, the genuinely open research question is posed whether there is one or more undergraduate student experience within English higher education. Answering this question depends on whether what is taught or what is learnt is examined. If the latter, then a unitary student experience can be said to exist only in the narrowest of normative senses. What undergraduates actually learn – defined in the widest sense – is the $64,000 question of research on the student experience. Various ways to answer this question are proposed, including using students to research students. Conceptual tools to apply to findings can be developed from youth studies and cognate disciplines, particularly in relation to student identities and aspirations. Lastly, these proposals are placed in the wider context of comparative models of the varieties of student experience, including those emerging in the UK’s national regions.

Socrates and Plato on asking ‘what is x?’

The Socratic elenchus is a method of philosophical enquiry attributed by Plato, in his dialogues, to his teacher Socrates. It is a method that uses a dialectic technique of questioning and answering to try to discover the truth of the issue under investigation. For Plato’s Socrates, the fundamental question for human beings is that of how to live, thus the enquiries he initiates concern our understanding of what it is to act ethically. In order to begin to enquire into how to act in a virtuous manner, however, Socrates claimed that we must first know what virtue is. We must, that is, first understand the meaning of virtue before we can consider its application it to any particular kind of action; we must first be able to answer the question “what is x?” before considering whether a particular action or kind of action is an instance of x. This requirement leads to what is known as the ‘Socratic Paradox’: if we have to first establish what x means before we confirm or discount cases of it, then how can our enquiry ever commence; how can we begin in asking questions about x if we don’t yet know what x is? Philosophy has continued to grapple with the Socratic paradox since Plato’s formulation of it. This presentation will explain how the paradox is produced out of the elenchus and consider the ways in which Wittgenstein’s account of family resemblance sheds new light upon this age-old issue. [From the Author]