Financing the development of poor communities in the Northern Cape of South Africa - an analytical framework for the study of livestock banks

This paper is part of a major project about the Northern Cape Land Reform and Advocacy (NCLRA) programme being implemented by FARM-Africa* in South Africa. The NCLRA programme had initiated a financial mechanism to help poor communities to get access to finance and training in order to enable them to make better use of their newly-acquired land. One prominent aspect of the programme is the implementation of Livestock Banks, or the use of animals as financial products. The paper provides an analytical framework with which to evaluate the effectiveness of Livestock Banks in the poor communities of the Northern Cape in South Africa. It focuses on the design, implementation and future of Livestock Banks. The paper argues that Livestock Banks need to be reformed and enhanced if they are to continue to play a key role in the goal of creating financial and economic value in Africa, particularly when the primary objective is simultaneously to help reduce poverty. [Note]*FARM-Africa (Food & Agricultural Research Management) is a registered UK charity organisation and a company limited by guarantee in England and Wales no. 01926828.

The food multimix concept: potential of an innovative food based approach on nutritional status in pregnant women in resource-poor communities

RATIONALE & OBJECTIVES: The food multimix (FFM)concept states that limited food resources can be combined using scientific knowledge to meet nutrient needs of vulnerable groups at low cost utilizing the ‘nutrient strengths’ of individual or candidate foods in composite recipes within a cultural context. METHODS: The method employed the food-to-food approach for recipe development using traditional food ingredients. Recipes were subjected to proximate and micronutrient analysis and optimized to meet at tleast 40% of recommended daily intakes. End products including breads, porridge and soup were developed. RESULTS: FMM products were employed in a feeding trial among 120 healthy pregnant women in Gauteng, South Africa resulting in improvements in serum iron levels from baseline values of 14.59 (=/-7.67) umol/L and 14.02 (=/-8.13) umol/L for control and intervention groups (p=0.71), to 16.03 (=/-5.67) umol/L and 18.66 (=/-9.41) umol/L (p=0.19). The increases from baseline to post-intervention were however statistically significant within groups. Similarly Mean Cell Volume values improved from baseline as well as serum ferritin and transferritin levels. CONCLUSION: The FMM concept has potential value in feeding programs for vulnerable groups including pregnant and lactating mothers.

So what if students are poor at numeracy?

The numeracy skill of student is a continued concern with numeracy highlighted as a key skill in Foundation degrees and other vocational courses such as nursing (DfES 1999, NMC 2007). Numeracy is seen as a requirement to being able to undertake work based skills that require the use of numbers and calculations. However numeracy skills developed in the classroom does not necessarily prepare students for work-based calculations and similarly nor does poor numeracy skills necessarily mean that students cannot perform complex mathematical calculations in their work place. This paper will explore the role of context, the difference between formal and work based mathematics and questions the continued focus on numeracy skills, using examples from my own research with nurses.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Profitability and the poor: corporate strategies, innovation and sustainability

Based on empirical evidence, the article looks at the implications of private sector participation (PSP) for the delivery of water supply and sanitation to the urban and peri-urban poor in developing countries, with particular reference to Africa and Latin America. More precisely, the article addresses the impact produced by multinational companies’ (MNCs) strategies, in light of the pursuit of profitability, on the extension of connections to the pipeline network. It does so by questioning the assumptions that greater private sector efficiency and innovation, together with contract design, will enable the sustainable extension of service coverage to low income dwellers. The strategies of the major water MNCs are considered both in relation to the global expansion of their operations and the adjustment of local strategies to commercial considerations. The latter might result in identifying proWtable markets, modifying contractual provisions, attempting to reduce costs and increase income, reducing risks and exiting from non-performing contracts. The evidence reviewed allows for re-assessing the relative roles of the public and private sectors in extending and delivering water services to the poor. First, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity than from MNCs. Secondly, whenever MNCs are liable to exit from non-profitable contracts, the public sector has no other option than to deal with external risks aVecting continuity of provision. Finally, market limitations affecting MNCs’ ability to serve marginal populations and access cheap capital do not apply to well-organised, politically led public sector undertakings