Simulating the Swissair flight 111 in-flight fire using the CFD fire simulation software SMARTFIRE

At 8.18pm on 2 September 1998, Swissair Flight 111 (SR 111), took off from New York’s JFK airport bound for Geneva, Switzerland. Tragically, the MD-11 aircraft never arrived. According to the crash investigation report, published on 27 March 2003, electrical arcing in the ceiling void cabling was the most likely cause of the fire that brought down the aircraft. No one on board was aware of the disaster unfolding in the ceiling of the aircraft and, when a strange odour entered the cockpit, the pilots thought it was a problem with the air-conditioning system. Twenty minutes later, Swissair Flight 111 plunged into the Atlantic Ocean five nautical miles southwest of Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia, with the loss of all 229 lives on board. In this paper, the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) analysis of the in-flight fire that brought down SR 111 is described. Reconstruction of the wreckage disclosed that the fire pattern was extensive and complex in nature. The fire damage created significant challenges to identify the origin of the fire and to appropriately explain the heat damage observed. The SMARTFIRE CFD software was used to predict the “possible” behaviour of airflow as well as the spread of fire and smoke within SR 111. The main aims of the CFD analysis were to develop a better understanding of the possible effects, or lack thereof, of numerous variables relating to the in-flight fire. Possible fire and smoke spread scenarios were studied to see what the associated outcomes would be. This assisted investigators at Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada, Fire & Explosion Group in assessing fire dynamics for cause and origin determination.

CFD fire simulation of the Swissair flight 111 in-flight fire - part II: fire spread analysis

In 1998, Swissair Flight I I I (SR111) developed an in-flight fire shortly after take-off which resulted in the loss of the aircraft, a McDonnell Douglas MD-I 1, and all passengers and crew. The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada, Fire and Explosion Group launched a four year investigation into the incident in an attempt to understand the cause and subsequent mechanisms which lead to the rapid spread of the in-flight fire. As part of this investigation, the SMARTFIRE Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) software was used to predict the 'possible' development of the fire and associated smoke movement. In this paper the CFD fire simulations are presented and model predictions compared with key findings from the investigation. The model predictions are shown to be consistent with a number of the investigation findings associated with the early stages of the fire development. The analysis makes use of simulated pre-fire airflow conditions within the MD-11 cockpit and above ceiling region presented in an earlier publication (Part 1) which was published in The Aeronautical Journal in January 2006(4).

Contractual termination of leases: lessons from the Commonwealth: Pt. 1

This, the first part of a three-part article on contractual termination of leases, considers the extent to which determination of a lease in accordance with the contract law principles of frustration and acceptance of a repudiatory breach has been accepted by Commonwealth courts. Reviews the approaches adopted by the courts in Canada, the US and Australia to the application of contractual principles to landlord and tenant disputes.

Contractual termination of leases: lessons from the Commonwealth: Pt. 2

This, the second part of a three-part article on contractual termination of leases, considers the extent to which English courts have allowed the contract law principles of frustration and acceptance of a repudiatory breach to be applied to leaseholds. Distinguishes cases involving a repudiatory breach by a landlord from those where the tenant is the one in breach.

Contractual termination of leases: lessons from the Commonwealth: Pt. 3

This, the third part of a three-part article on the contractual termination of leases, examines, with reference to UK and Commonwealth case law, the connection between contractual termination and the provisions of legislation including the the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Pt II relating to forfeiture and termination of business tenancies. Considers why contractual termination by acceptance of a repudiatory breach is a necessary development to protect tenants in the event of a landlord's significant default.