A reified temporal logic

This paper presents a reified temporal logic for representing and reasoning about temporal and non-temporal relationships between non-temporal assertions. A clear syntax and semantics for the logic is formally provided. Three types of predicates, temporal predicates, non-temporal predicates and meta-predicates, are introduced. Terms of the proposed language are partitioned into three types, temporal terms, non-temporal terms and propositional terms. Reified propositions consist of formulae with each predicate being either a temporal predicate or a meta-predicate. Meta-predicates may take both temporal terms and propositional terms together as arguments or take propositional terms alone. A standard formula of the classical first-order language with each predicate being a non-temporal predicate taking only non-temporal terms as arguments is reified as just a propositional term. A general time ontology has been provided which can be specialized to a variety of existing temporal systems. The new logic allows one to predicate and quantify over propositional terms while according a special status of time; for example, assertions such as ‘effects cannot precede their causes’ is ensured in the logic, and some problematic temporal aspects including the delay time between events and their effects can be conveniently expressed. Applications of the logic are presented including the characterization of the negation of properties and their contextual sentences, and the expression of temporal relations between actions and effects.

A discrete formalism for reasoning about action and change

This paper presents a discrete formalism for temporal reasoning about actions and change, which enjoys an explicit representation of time and action/event occurrences. The formalism allows the expression of truth values for given fluents over various times including nondecomposable points/moments and decomposable intervals. Two major problems which beset most existing interval-based theories of action and change, i.e., the so-called dividing instant problem and the intermingling problem, are absent from this new formalism. The dividing instant problem is overcome by excluding the concepts of ending points of intervals, and the intermingling problem is bypassed by means of characterising the fundamental time structure as a well-ordered discrete set of non-decomposable times (points and moments), from which decomposable intervals are constructed. A comprehensive characterisation about the relationship between the negation of fluents and the negation of involved sentences is formally provided. The formalism provides a flexible expression of temporal relationships between effects and their causal events, including delayed effects of events which remains a problematic question in most existing theories about action and change.