Kappa calculus and evidential strength: A note on Åqvist's logical theory of legal evidence

Lennart Åqvist (1992) proposed a logical theory of legal evidence, based on the Bolding-Ekelöf of degrees of evidential strength. This paper reformulates Åqvist's model in terms of the probabilistic version of the kappa calculus. Proving its acceptability in the legal context is beyond the present scope, but the epistemological debate about Bayesian Law isclearly relevant. While the present model is a possible link to that lineof inquiry, we offer some considerations about the broader picture of thepotential of AI & Law in the evidentiary context. Whereas probabilisticreasoning is well-researched in AI, calculations about the threshold ofpersuasion in litigation, whatever their value, are just the tip of theiceberg. The bulk of the modeling desiderata is arguably elsewhere, if one isto ideally make the most of AI's distinctive contribution as envisaged forlegal evidence research.

The Jama legal narrative part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches, which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, I reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: 'The JAMA Model and Narrative Interpretation Patterns'), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability were infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially Bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flourishing among legal scholars; nowadays both the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and the Bayesio-skeptics (e.g. Ron Allen), among those legal scholars who are involved in the controversy, are willing to give AI research a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application of probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making. Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

Constructive notice and independent legal advice: a study of lending institution practice

Cases on when lending institutions will be put on inquiry as to circumstances giving rise to presumption of undue influence, and results of research on lending practice of residential mortgage lenders in light of case law. [From Legal Journals Index]

Law in the community: the University of Greenwich/Greenwich Association of Disabled People Centre for Independent Living (GAD) research project

The GAD Advocacy Service is funded by the London Borough of Greenwich Directorate of Neighbourhood Services; its remit to support disabled people experiencing Hate Crime, Domestic Violence and Harassment. Run by disabled personnel and giving advice to all disabled people it is unique in London. Since its inception in 2004, the Advocacy Service has been stretched to its limit - there is a need to extend the remit of the Advocacy Service to give specialist legal advice on other issues. In 2003, the CEDRM-UK project was set up in the University of Greenwich Law Department as part of the Disability Rights Promotion International Legal Education and Research Project; its objectives were firstly, to facilitate the collection of data on the effectiveness of legislation in promoting the rights of disabled persons; and secondly, to pilot new methods in teaching and training in Human Rights Law – students acquire an expertise in Human Rights Law through research into the practical application of legislation relating to civil and human rights in the daily life of the community. In July 2007, GAD and CEDRM-UK embarked on a joint project to report on the work of the Advocacy Service and to create a database to support its caseload. The 2008-9 Project team will report on their work and findings relating to facilitating equality in the workplace; the inclusion of cancer, HIV and multiple sclerosis within the legal definition of disability and the implications of the statutory duty to promote disability equality for the provision of extracurricular activities for schoolchildren. [From the Author]

Legal myth-making: Medea and the legal representation of the feminine ‘other'

The Law operates by, and through, the creation of ideal benchmarks of conduct that are deemed to be representative of the behavioural norm. It is in this sense that it could be contended that the Law utilises, and relies on, myths in the same way as do other disciplines, notably psycho-analysis. It is possible to go even further and argue that the use of a created narrative mythology is essential to the establishment of a defined legal benchmark of behaviour by which the female defendant is assessed, judged and punished. While mythology expresses and symbolizes cultural and political behaviour, it is the Law that embodies and prescribes punitive sanctions. This element represents a powerful literary strand in classical mythology. This may be seen, for instance, in Antigone’s appeal to the Law as justification for her conduct, as much as in Medea’s challenge to the Law though her desire for vengeance. Despite its image of neutral, objective rationality, the Law, in creating and sustaining the ideals of legally-sanctioned conduct, engages in the same literary processes of imagination, reason and emotion that are central to the creation and re-creation of myth. The (re-)presentation of the Medea myth in literature (especially in theatre) and in art, finds its echo in the theatre of the courtroom where wronged women who have refused to passively accept their place, have instead responded with violence. Consequently, the Medea myth, in its depiction of the (un)feminine, serves as a template for the Law’s judgment of ‘conventional’ feminine conduct in the roles of wife and mother. Medea is an image of deviant femininity, as is Lady Macbeth and the countless other un-feminine literary and mythological women who challenge the power of the dominant culture and its ally, the Law. These women stand opposed to the other dominant theme of both literature and Law: the conformist woman, the passive dupe, who are victims of male oppression – women such as Ariadne of Naxos and Tess of the D’Ubervilles – and who are subsequently consumed by the Law, much as Semele is consumed by the fire of Jupiter’s gaze upon her. All of these women, the former as well as the latter, have their real-life counterparts in the pages of the Law Reports. As Fox puts it, “these women have come to bear the weight of the cultural stereotypes and preconceptions about women who kill.”