The effect of ownership structure, country governance, and financial development on the capital structure of unlisted eastern European firms

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.

Interlocking directorships

[Introduction] When a director of one company at the same time serves on the board of another company, the two companies are said to be interlocked by that director. Through this linkage each company has potential access to information about the activities of the other, either explicitly as intelligence transferred by the director or implicitly in shaping the director’s perspective and general views. Director interlocks formed by executive directors, employed by the firm, are generally interpreted as more instrumental for the firm than those formed by non-executive directors. Firms are often interlocked with more than one other firm and those firms, in turn, with others; a web of social relationships envelops business.

Isomorphic effects of managerial and directoral career paths

The extensive array of interlocking directorate research remains near-exclusively cross-sectional or comparative cross-sectional in nature. While this has been fruitful in identifying persistent structures of inter-organisational relationships evidence of the impact of these structures on organisational performance or activity has been more limited. This should not be surprising because, by their nature, relationships have strong longitudinal and dynamic qualities that are likely to be difficult to isolate through cross-sectional approaches. Clearly, managerial practice is inevitably strongly conditioned by the specific contingencies of the time and the information available through networks of colleagues and advisers (particularly at board level) at the time. But managerial and directoral capabilities and mental sets are also developed over time, particularly through previous experiences in these roles and the formation of long-lasting 'strong' and 'weak' relationships. This paper tests the influence of three longitudinal dimensions of managers and directors' relationships on a set of indicators of financial performance, drawing from a large dataset of detailing historic board membership of UK firms. It finds evidence of isomorphic processes through these channels and establishes that the longitudinal design considerably enhances the detection of performance effects from directorate interlocks. More broadly, the research has implications for the conception of collective action and the constitution of 'community'.

Private equity and employment - the Davos/WEF/Harvard study

The World Economic Forum at Davos has published a major study showing that workplaces of firms taken over by private equity have 10% less employees 5 years after the takeover, than other similar workplaces. The rate of plant closures, opening, acquisitions and disposals is twice as high as in other firms, and the net effect is still a job loss of 3.6%-4.5% after only 2 years, compared with other firms. Firms taken over by private equity are also more likely to go bankrupt than publicly quoted firms.