Organisational whistleblowing policies: making employees responsible or liable?

This paper explores the possible impact of the recent legal developments on organizational whistleblowing on the autonomy and responsibility of whistleblowers. In the past thirty years numerous pieces of legislation have been passed to offer protection to whistleblowers from retaliation for disclosing organisational wrongdoing. An area that remains uncertain in relation to whistleblowing and its related policies in organisations, is whether these policies actually increase the individualisation of work, allowing employees to behave in accordance with their conscience and in line with societal expectations or whether they are another management tool to control employees and protect organisations from them. The assumptions of whistleblower protection with regard to moral autonomy are examined in order to clarify the purpose of whistleblower protection at work. The two extreme positions in the discourse of whistleblowing are that whistleblowing legislation and policies either aim to enable individual responsibility and moral autonomy at work, or they aim to protect organisations by allowing them to control employees and make them liable for ethics at work.

Flexible self-adjustment of task deployment in dynamic environments

This paper presents an investigation into dynamic self-adjustment of task deployment and other aspects of self-management, through the embedding of multiple policies. Non-dedicated loosely-coupled computing environments, such as clusters and grids are increasingly popular platforms for parallel processing. These abundant systems are highly dynamic environments in which many sources of variability affect the run-time efficiency of tasks. The dynamism is exacerbated by the incorporation of mobile devices and wireless communication. This paper proposes an adaptive strategy for the flexible run-time deployment of tasks; to continuously maintain efficiency despite the environmental variability. The strategy centres on policy-based scheduling which is informed by contextual and environmental inputs such as variance in the round-trip communication time between a client and its workers and the effective processing performance of each worker. A self-management framework has been implemented for evaluation purposes. The framework integrates several policy-controlled, adaptive services with the application code, enabling the run-time behaviour to be adapted to contextual and environmental conditions. Using this framework, an exemplar self-managing parallel application is implemented and used to investigate the extent of the benefits of the strategy

Public-public partnerships (PUPs) in water

Water operators need to be efficient, accountable, honest public institutions providing a universal service. Many water services however lack the institutional strength, the human resources, the technical expertise and equipment, or the financial or managerial capacity to provide these services. They need support to develop these capacities. The vast majority of water operators in the world are in the public sector – 90% of all major cities are served by such bodies. This means that the largest pool of experience and expertise, and the great majority of examples of good practice and sound institutions, are to be found in existing public sector water operators. Because they are public sector, however, they do not have any natural commercial incentive to provide international support. Their incentive stems from solidarity, not profit. Since 1990, however, the policies of donors and development banks have focussed on the private companies and their incentives. The vast resources of the public sector have been overlooked, even blocked by pro-private policies. Out of sight of these global policy-makers, however, a growing number of public sector water companies have been engaged, in a great variety of ways, in helping others develop the capacity to be effective and accountable public services. These supportive arrangements are now called 'public-public partnerships' (PUPs). A public-public partnership (PUP) is simply a collaboration between two or more public authorities or organisations, based on solidarity, to improve the capacity and effectiveness of one partner in providing public water or sanitation services. They have been described as: “a peer relationship forged around common values and objectives, which exclude profit-seeking”.1 Neither partner expects a commercial profit, directly or indirectly. This makes PUPs very different from the public–private partnerships (PPPs) which have been promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank. The problems of PPPs have been examined in a number of reports. A great advantage of PUPs is that they avoid the risks of such partnerships: transaction costs, contract failure, renegotiation, the complexities of regulation, commercial opportunism, monopoly pricing, commercial secrecy, currency risk, and lack of public legitimacy.2 PUPs are not merely an abstract concept. The list in the annexe to this paper includes over 130 PUPs in around 70 countries. This means that far more countries have hosted PUPs than host PPPs in water – according to a report from PPIAF in December 2008, there are only 44 countries with private participation in water. These PUPs cover a period of over 20 years, and been used in all regions of the world. The earliest date to the 1980s, when the Yokohama Waterworks Bureau first started partnerships to help train staff in other Asian countries. Many of the PUP projects have been initiated in the last few years, a result of the growing recognition of PUPs as a tool for achieving improvements in public water management. This paper attempts to provide an overview of the typical objectives of PUPs; the different forms of PUPs and partners involved; a series of case studies of actual PUPs; and an examination of the recent WOPs initiative. It then offers recommendations for future development of PUPs.

Corporate policies in the EU energy sector

This report examines the corporate policies of the major European energy companies, including the major developments in 2008.

Training teachers for further and technical education 1950-1982: staff perceptions of changing demands and policies

This paper aims to create a picture of aspects of the working lives of some trainers of technical and further education teachers in a specialist teacher training college in Bolton, Lancashire, from the 1950s to the 1980's. There is little reference to technical teacher training in the literature on teacher training in the second half of the twentieth century. With this gap in mind, this paper sets out to record some memories and impressions of staff involved during these years. Using data from a series of semi-structured interviews, the discussion centres upon their perceptions of their work: of their students, the working environment, the curriculum and their relationships with the technical colleges for whom they were training teachers. The paper has three sections. It begins with a brief discussion of the issues arising from the choice of research methods. The second section contextualises the study and traces the history of Bolton Technical Teachers' Training College from its establishment through to its merger with the Institute of Technology in 1982. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the interview data.

Challenges to Slovakia and Poland health policy decisions: use of investment treaties to claim compensation for reversal of privatisation/liberalisation policies

Investment treaties, and possibly the EU Treaty itself, are being used by multinational companies Penta and Eureko to try and force the Slovak government to pay compensation for reversing health privatisation and liberalisation policies. Similar action has been used against the Polish government by Eureko to win compensation worth nearly 2 billion Euros and a policy commitment to further privatisation.

Public sector pay in the UK: has the historic pattern of public/private sector pay movements been broken?

The historic pattern of public sector pay movements in the UK has been counter-cyclical with private sector pay growth. Periods of relative decline in public sector pay against private sector movements have been followed by periods of ‘catch-up’ as Government controls are eased to remedy skill shortages or deal with industrial unrest among public servants. Public sector ‘catch up’ increases have therefore come at awkward times for Government, often coinciding with economic downturn in the private sector (Trinder 1994, White 1996, Bach 2002). Several such epochs of public sector pay policy can be identified since the 1970s. The question is whether the current limits on public sector pay being imposed by the UK Government fit this historic pattern or whether the pattern has been broken and, if so, how and why? This paper takes a historical approach in considering the context to public sector pay determination in the UK. In particular the paper seeks to review the period since Labour came into office (White and Hatchett 2003) and the various pay ‘modernisation’ exercises that have been in process over the last decade (White 2004). The paper draws on national statistics on public sector employment and pay levels to chart changes in public sector pay policy and draws on secondary literature to consider both Government policy intentions and the impact of these policies for public servants.