Waste management companies in Europe 2009

This paper examines the ownership, employment and finances of the major waste companies in Europe, and recent developments in ownership.

Waste management in Europe: framework, trends and issues

This paper reviews major factors affecting the waste managment sector in Europe, including EU legislation, ECJ rulings, the economic crisis, outsourcing and municipalisation, and employment, including disputes and pay and conditions.

A crisis for public-private partnerships (PPPs)?

The credit squeeze and recession are combining to make PPPs almost impossible to finance, anywhere in the world. Traditional government borrowing and procurement can still be used to implement infrastructure programmes.

Developing “middle leaders” in the public services? The realities of management and leadership development for public managers

Purpose – This paper aims to assess the actual contribution to organisational change of management and leadership development (MLD) activity for middle managers (MMs) in public service organisations (PSOs). Design/methodology/approach – Using the case study approach, the paper compares the content and outcomes of management and leadership training interventions for MMs in two large PSOs. The organisations, a fire brigade and a train operating company, are leaders in their sectors with respect to management development and “modernisation” of their services. Findings – The paper demonstrates how, in one case, MM development was largely an exercise in regulatory compliance, with little effect on individual MMs' performance or organisational outcomes. The second case demonstrates how MMs were effectively trained to enforce specific human resource policies which contributed to the successful implementation of top-down strategy yet paid little attention to the potential leadership role of MMs. Research limitations/implications – The paper highlights the need for further contextualised research at organisational level into the outcomes of MLD, especially in terms of different public service contexts. Practical implications – The paper demonstrates the dangers of designing and implementing development programmes without sufficient regard to professional practice and the realities of managerial discretion in PSOs. Originality/value – The paper provides an in-depth and contextualised insight into the conditions for success and failure in management development interventions in PSOs.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Private equity, productivity and earnings

A detailed study in the USA shows that workers experience a relative fall in earnings after a takeover by private equity. Also, companies bought by private equity are at great risk of defaulting on their debts in the next 2 years.

A study on the cost sharing model for supply lead time reduction with component commonality

This paper studies a two-level supply chain consisting of components supplier and product assembly manufacturer, while the manufacturer shares the investment on shortening supply lead time. The objective of this research is to investigate the benefits of cost sharing strategy and adopting component commonality. The result of numerical analysis demonstrates that using component commonality can help reduce the total cost, especially when the manufacture shares a higher fraction of the cost of investment in shortening supply lead time.

Interlocking directorships

[Introduction] When a director of one company at the same time serves on the board of another company, the two companies are said to be interlocked by that director. Through this linkage each company has potential access to information about the activities of the other, either explicitly as intelligence transferred by the director or implicitly in shaping the director’s perspective and general views. Director interlocks formed by executive directors, employed by the firm, are generally interpreted as more instrumental for the firm than those formed by non-executive directors. Firms are often interlocked with more than one other firm and those firms, in turn, with others; a web of social relationships envelops business.

Economic crisis and public services: note 1, December 2008

The paper examines the impact of the economic crisis on public services, including government reponses and implications for companies operating in public services.

The missing link between information and action: hastenings and delays as universal reactions to performance feedback

This chapter focuses on what the key decision makers in organizations decide after having received information on the current state of the organizational performance. Because of strong attributions to success and failure, it is impossible to predict in advance which concrete actions will occur. We can however find out what kinds of actions are decided upon by means of an organizational learning model that focuses on the hastenings and delays after performance feedback. As an illustration, the responses to performance signals by trainers and club owners in Dutch soccer clubs are analyzed.

More public rescues for more private finance failures - a critique of the EC Communication on PPPs

A critique of the EC Communication on PPPs, challenging the scale of state aid offered to PPPs, the role of PPPs in the economic recovery strategy for the EU, and drawing attention to the damage done to public authorities by 'innovative' financing mechanisms.