Joint ownership and beneficial entitlement: Stack v Dowden.

Explores the issue of the share of beneficial entitlement to the family home where the legal title is jointly owned, but where there has not been an express declaration of a beneficial joint tenancy. Discusses the House of Lords judgment in Stack v Dowden which addressed this point. Explains how the judges moved the focus away from the court imposing its own sense of fairness on the parties or imputing an intention based on the circumstances to one where the concentration will be on the parties' relevant conduct. Outlines three other points of interest referred to in the judgment: (1) whether an indirect financial contribution could support a constructive trust; (2) whether proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trusts should be assimilated; and (3) whether a mortgage liability is equivalent to a financial contribution.

Beneficial entitlement: no longer doing justice?

Discusses the House of Lords ruling in Stack v Dowden on the size of each legal owner's share of the equity in the family home in the event of the relationship breakdown of an unmarried couple. Considers whether the parties intended their beneficial interests to be different to their legal interests in the property. Comments on the court's primary concern of establishing, from the parties' conduct, their intention as regards beneficial ownership. Looks at whether indirect financial contributions give rise to a beneficial interest under a constructive trust and notes the relevance of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

Home is where my archive is

The miniaturization and dissemination of audiovisual media into small, mobile assemblages of cameras, screens and microphones has brought "database cinema" (Manovich) into pockets and handbags. In turn, this micro-portability of video production calls for a reconsideration of database cinema, not as an aesthetic but rather as a media ecology that makes certain experiences and forms of interaction possible. In this context the clip and the fragment become a social currency (showing, trading online, etc.), and the enjoyment of a moment or "occasion" becomes an opportunity for recording, extending, preserving and displaying. If we are now the documentarists of our lives (as so many mobile phone adverts imply), it follows that we are also our own archivists as well. From the folksonomies of Flickr and YouTube to the slick "media centres" of Sony, Apple and Microsoft, the audiovisual home archive is a prized territory of struggle among platforms and brands. The database is emerging as the dominant (screen) medium of popular creativity and distribution – but it also brings the categories of "home" and "person" closer to that of the archive.

Beneficial ownership and detriment

Considers the factors which contribute to a court finding that a cohabitee has a beneficial interest in property, in particular the detriment which is required to establish a constructive trust, with reference to the Chancery Division decision in Levi v Levi and previous case law. Outlines the provisions on express or inferred common intention. Considers whether a loan of money from the non-owning to the owning cohabitant, made at a lower level than commercial loans, towards the purchase the property was sufficient detriment to entitle her to proceeds of sale from the property.

Resulting trusts, joint borrowers and beneficial share

Reviews case law illustrating the courts' approach to beneficial ownership of property purchased in joint name by means of a joint mortgage but without any declaration of beneficial interest, the resulting trust and joint beneficial interest presumptions. Contrast the approach adopted in cases where one party made no contribution to the mortgage payments with those where both parties made a contribution. Highlights the courts' treatment of the right to buy discount afforded tenant purchasers and property purchased as a commercial venture rather than a home.

Insolvency: ordering a sale of the family home

Comments on the Chancery Division ruling in Nicholls v Lan on whether the interests of a bankrupt husband's creditors prevailed over those of the wife, despite her circumstances being exceptional within the meaning of the Insolvency Act 1986 s.335A on account of her suffering from chronic schizophrenia, where the wife was the joint owner of another property which could be realised to buy out the trustee in bankruptcy's half share in the equity of the matrimonial home.

Cohabitation and conflict

Considers some of the potential legal difficulties that can occur on the breakdown of a cohabiting couple's relationship. Covers disputes surrounding the ownership of the family home and the use of constructive trusts following the House of Lords decision in Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset. Outlines the recommendations of the Law Commission in its report Cohabitation: the Financial Consequences of Relationship Breakdown. [From Legal Journals Index]

Rights for cohabitants

Reviews the guidance given by the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden on quantifying the beneficial interests of cohabiting parties in their former family home when one party seeks to rebut the presumption of joint beneficial ownership. Comments on the subsequent application of the principles by the county court in Adekunle v Ritchie and by the Privy Council in Abbott v Abbott, highlighting the approaches used to establish an equitable interest and to quantify the parties' shares in the properties. Considers whether statutory intervention is now needed to resolve the difficulties. [From Legal Journals Index]

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

The effect of ownership structure, country governance, and financial development on the capital structure of unlisted eastern European firms

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.