‘Martial races’ and ‘imperial subjects’: violence and governance in colonial India, 1857–1914

This essay explores the specificity of colonial violence in India. Although imperial and military historians are familiar with several instances of such violence—notably the rebellion in 1857 and the 1919 massacre at the Jallianwalla Bagh in Amritsar—there is a broader, and arguably more significant, history that has largely escaped attention. In contrast to metropolitan European states, where sovereignty derived, at least in principle, from a covenant between subjects and government, the sovereign power of the colonial state was always predicated on the violent subjugation of ‘the natives’. However, while violence was integral to colonialism, such violence was never a purely metropolitan agency: most of those recruited to serve in the colonial military were, themselves, Indian. Exploring the history of the imperial military in South Asia after 1857, the paper outlines the complex and rather ambiguous relationship between the colonial state and its ‘native armies’. RESUME Cet article se penche sur la spe´cificite´ de la violence coloniale. Malgre´ des exemples familiers—comme la grande re´volte de 1857 en Inde ou le massacre de Jallianwalla Bagh a` Amritsar en 1919—il y a une histoire plus large et plus importante qui a e´chappe´e a` l’attention des historiens. Contrairement aux e´tats europe´ens ou la souverainete´ de´rivait en principe du moins d’un contrat social entre les acteurs sociaux, le pouvoir souverain de l’e´tat colonial restait fonde´ sur la subjugation violente des indige`nes.

Industrial water pollution in Dhaka, Bangladesh: strategies and incentives for pollution control in small and medium enterprises

The extent and gravity of the environmental degradation of the water resources in Dhaka due to untreated industrial waste is not fully recognised in international discourse. Pollution levels affect vast numbers, but the poor and the vulnerable are the worst affected. For example, rice productivity, the mainstay of poor farmers, in the Dhaka watershed has declined by 40% over a period of ten years. The study found significant correlations between water pollution and diseases such as jaundice, diarrhoea and skin problems. It was reported that the cost of treatment of one episode of skin disease could be as high as 29% of the weekly earnings of some of the poorest households. The dominant approach to deal with pollution in the SMEs is technocratic. Given the magnitude of the problem this paper argues that to control industrial pollution by SMEs and to enhance their compliance it is necessary to move from the technocratic approach to one which can also address the wider institutional and attitudinal issues. Underlying this shift is the need to adopt the appropriate methodology. The multi-stakeholder analysis enables an understanding of the actors, their influence, their capacity to participate in, or oppose change, and the existing and embedded incentive structures which allow them to pursue interests which are generally detrimental to environmental good. This enabled core and supporting strategies to be developed around three types of actors in industrial pollution, i.e., (i) principal actors, who directly contribute to industrial pollution; (ii) stakeholders who exacerbate the situation; and (iii) potential actors in mitigation. Within a carrot-and-stick framework, the strategies aim to improve environmental governance and transparency, set up a packet to incentive for industry and increase public awareness.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

The effect of ownership structure, country governance, and financial development on the capital structure of unlisted eastern European firms

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.

Strategies for water pollution control in Dhaka, Bangladesh: an institutional and economic analysis

This paper presents primary data based on research carried out as part of a large World Bank project. Results from our survey show that water pollution in Dhaka watershed has reached alarming levels and is posing significant threats to health and economic activity, particularly among the poor and vulnerable. Rice productivity in the watershed area, for example, has declined by 40% in recent years and vegetable cultivation in the riverbeds has been severely damaged. We also found significant correlation between water pollution and diseases such as jaundice, diarrhoea and skin problems. It was reported that the cost of treatment of skin diseases for one episode could be as high as 29% of the weekly earnings of poor households. Given the magnitude of the contamination problem, a multi-agent stakeholder approach was necessary to analyse the institutional and economic constraints that would need to be addressed in order to improve environmental management. This approach, in turn, enabled core strategies to be developed. The strategies were better understood around three types of actors in industrial pollution, i.e. (1) principal actors, who contribute directly to industrial pollution; (2) stakeholders, who exacerbate the situation by inaction; and (3) the potential actors in mitigation of water contamination. Within a carrot-and-stick framework, nine strategies leading to the strengthening of environmental management were explored. They aim at improving governance and transparency within public agencies and private industry through the setting up of incentive structures to advance compliance and enforcement of environmental standards. Civil society and the population at large are, on the other hand, encouraged to contribute actively to the mitigation of water pollution by improving the management of environmental information and by raising public awareness.