Relations, residuals, regular interiors, and relative regular equivalence

Given a relation α (a binary sociogram) and an a priori equivalence relation π, both on the same set of individuals, it is interesting to look for the largest equivalence πo that is contained in and is regular with respect to α. The equivalence relation πo is called the regular interior of π with respect to α. The computation of πo involves the left and right residuals, a concept that generalized group inverses to the algebra of relations. A polynomial-time procedure is presented (Theorem 11) and illustrated with examples. In particular, the regular interior gives meet in the lattice of regular equivalences: the regular meet of regular equivalences is the regular interior of their intersection. Finally, the concept of relative regular equivalence is defined and compared with regular equivalence.

[BSHM meetings] Topics in the history of financial mathematics: early commerce to chaos in modern stock markets

This account provides an overview of the study day, entitled 'Topics in the History of Financial Mathematics: Early commerce to chaos in modern stock markets,' held by the British Society for the History of Mathematics jointly with Gresham College, at Gresham College, London on 25th April 2008. The series of talks explored the development of mathematics and mathematical techniques in a commercial and financial context.

The financial crisis and nuclear power

An assessment of the impact of the financial crisis on the prospects for new nuclear power plant orders worldwide.

Private equity: financial investors, public services, and employment

The report surveys the activity of private equity and other financial investors in the water, waste and healthcare sectors in Europe. It includes the appraisal of a WEF study on employment effects.

The effect of ownership structure, country governance, and financial development on the capital structure of unlisted eastern European firms

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.

Employee reward: alternatives, consequences and contexts

[Book Contents] Introducing Employee Reward Systems; Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks; The Legal, Employment Relations and Market Context; Base Pay Structures and Relationships; Pay Setting, Composition and Progression; Variable Pay Schemes; Benefits; Pensions; Non-Financial Reward; Rewarding Directors and Executives; International Reward Management; Employee Reward within HRM.