On "fitting in": the effects of social context and gender on big 5 trait expression.

[This is a summary of an Oral Presentation] The study explored the expression of Big 5 personality traits in three different social contexts (with parents friends and work colleagues) to test the prediction that personality is socially variable due to the motivation to ‘fit in’. The questionnaire-based method produced results that support this hypothesis; all Big 5 traits were significantly variable across contexts with Conscientiousness the least variable and Extraversion possessiveness. The results indicated that females reported being more distressed than males and older respondents reported being less distressed then younger respondents. The findings from this study contribute to the literature on online infidelity in terms of understanding differences in the way it is perceived.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Ambitious mothers – successful daughters: Mothers’ early expectations for children’s education and children’s earnings and sense of control in adult life

Background. Mothers' expectations for their children's educational attainment are related to children's educational and occupational attainment. Studies have yet to establish, however, the long-term links between maternal expectations and offspring earnings, which are not always related to occupational attainment especially in women, or between maternal expectations and offspring sense of control and self-efficacy, which are pivotal factors in career choice and development. Aims. To explore the role of mothers' expectations for their children's educational attainment in children's earnings attainment and sense of control later in life. Method. Data from sweeps of the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) were used. The study sample was those cohort members with complete information on all the variables of interest. The study sample (N = 3,285) was more educated and less disadvantaged than the whole sample. If cohort members of this type are more likely to have a mother who has high expectations, then our results are biased downwards, which suggests that we underestimate the effect of expectations on our two outcome variables. Results. Mothers' expectations at the age of 10 were positively related to daughters' sense of control at the age of 30 even after controlling for ethnicity, educational attainment, and concurrent partner, parent, and labour market participation status, as well as the following confounding variables (measured at the ages of 0–10): general ability and general ability squared, locus of control, emotional and behavioural problems and emotional and behavioural problems squared, socio-economic disadvantage, parental social class, parental family structure, and mothers' education, child-rearing attitudes, and mental health. Mothers' expectations had no effect on sons' adult outcomes. Conclusions. Given that women are particularly at risk for poor psychological and economic outcomes in adulthood, and that this study likely underestimated the effect of expectations on these two outcomes, this is an important conclusion.