The Jama legal narrative. Part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, we reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: "The Jama Model. On Legal Narratives and Interpretation Patterns"), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story, is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability was infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for AI researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flouishing among legal scholars. Nowadays both the the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and Bayesioskeptics (e.g. Ron Allen) among those legal scholars whoare involved in the controversy are willing to give AI researchers a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application or probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making (Rosoni 1995). Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

The Jama legal narrative part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches, which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, I reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: 'The JAMA Model and Narrative Interpretation Patterns'), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability were infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially Bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flourishing among legal scholars; nowadays both the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and the Bayesio-skeptics (e.g. Ron Allen), among those legal scholars who are involved in the controversy, are willing to give AI research a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application of probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making. Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

Subrogation and non-payment of rent

Explains the equitable doctrine of subrogation as it applies to tenants, assignees and landlords. Outlines the basic principle of subrogation and examines how the principle affects the legal position of the original tenant, the tenant's assignee, the tenant's surety and the original landlord.

X-ray crystallographic structures of two lamotrigine analogues: (I) 3,5-diamino-6-(2-chlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine water solvate and (II) 3,5-diamino-6-(3,6-dichlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine methanol solvate

The X-ray crystal structures of two lamotrigine derivatives (I) 3,5-diamino-6-(2-chlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine, C9H8ClN5, (465BL) as a hydrate, and (II) 3,5-diamino-6-(3,6-dichlorophenyl)-1,2,4-triazine, C9H7Cl2N5, (469BR) as a methanol solvate, have been carried out at liquid nitrogen temperature and room temperature, respectively. A detailed comparison of the two structures is given. Both are centrosymmetric with (I) in the orthorhombic space group Pbca, a = 12.2507(3), b = 15.7160(6), c = 21.71496(9) angstrom, Z = 16, and (II) in the monoclinic space group C2/c, a = 38.553(3), b = 4.9586(2), c = 14.546(2) angstrom, beta = 111.59(1)degrees, Z = 8. Final R indices [I > 2sigma(I)] for (I) are R1 = 0.0670, wR2 = 0.1515 and for (II) R1 = 0.0434, wR2 = 0.1185. Structure (I) has water of crystallization in the lattice and (II) includes a solvated CH3OH. Structure (I) is characterized by having two crystallographically independent molecules, A and B, of 465BL, per asymmetric unit. Molecule B has a very unusual feature in that the 2-chlorophenyl ring is statistically disordered, occupying site (1) in 87.5% of the structure and site (2) in 12.5% of the structure. Sites (1) and (2) are related by an exact 180 degrees pivot of the phenyl ring about the ring linkage bond. The presence of two independent molecules per asymmetric unit provides an ideal opportunity for the conformational flexibility of the molecule 465BL to be studied. Structure (I) also includes a further unusual feature in that the lattice contains one fully occupied water molecule and an additional solvated water which is only 33% occupied.

Beneficial entitlement: no longer doing justice?

Discusses the House of Lords ruling in Stack v Dowden on the size of each legal owner's share of the equity in the family home in the event of the relationship breakdown of an unmarried couple. Considers whether the parties intended their beneficial interests to be different to their legal interests in the property. Comments on the court's primary concern of establishing, from the parties' conduct, their intention as regards beneficial ownership. Looks at whether indirect financial contributions give rise to a beneficial interest under a constructive trust and notes the relevance of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

Duty to mitigate in leasehold law

Discusses by reference to case law, including Commonwealth authorities, the rights and duties of landlords where demised premises are abandoned by a tenant who has defaulted on the rent, including the remedies available to the landlord, the limitations on his right to sue for loss of rent due between abandonment and expiration of the term, and the applicability of the contractual doctrine of mitigation of damages in leasehold law. Examines the Court of Appeal decision in Reichman v Beveridge on the duty of mitigate loss in an action merely seeking recovery of rent as it accrues due.

Constructive thinking

Discusses the House of Lords ruling in Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd on whether the doctrine of constructive trust, as an alternative to proprietary estoppel, could be invoked by a property developer under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s.2(5) where an agreement for the acquisition of an interest in land failed to comply with s.2(1), but where the developer had incurred expenditure obtaining planning permission to develop the property. Reflects on whether there are circumstances in which the courts will find a constructive trust in order to avoid the effects of s.2(1).