Divorce deals and bankruptcy

Discusses the rights and responsibilities of trustees and beneficiaries of co-owned land under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, in particular s.14 which allows the court to make an order declaring the extent and nature of a person's interest in the property. Refers to the Court of Appeal decision in Avis v Turner on whether the existence of an earlier court order postponing the sale of matrimonial property following the owners' divorce meant that an application could not be brought by a trustee in bankruptcy under s.14. Considers the "exceptional circumstances" which could allow the court to postpone the sale. [From Legal Journals Index]

Insolvency: ordering a sale of the family home

Comments on the Chancery Division ruling in Nicholls v Lan on whether the interests of a bankrupt husband's creditors prevailed over those of the wife, despite her circumstances being exceptional within the meaning of the Insolvency Act 1986 s.335A on account of her suffering from chronic schizophrenia, where the wife was the joint owner of another property which could be realised to buy out the trustee in bankruptcy's half share in the equity of the matrimonial home.

A just claim?

Discusses the law relating to the payment of occupation rent to a co-owner by the party remaining in the property after a relationship breakdown both under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 and where the Act is not applicable. Considers, with reference to the Chancery Division decision in Re Barcham, whether a trustee in bankruptcy acting on behalf of the non-occupying person can claim an occupation rent under the court's equitable jurisdiction.

What's exceptional?

Outlines the factors which the court needs to consider when deciding whether to grant an application for the sale of a property where the owner becomes bankrupt. Considers the different priorities to be given to the claims of trustees in bankruptcy and to secure lenders, with reference to the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 ss.14 and 15, the Insolvency Act 1986 s.355A, and the exceptional circumstances in which claims will not be granted. Explores case law, in particular the Court of Appeal ruling in Avis v Turner, and the implications of the Human Rights Act 1998. [From Legal Journals Index]

Undue influence: back door tactics?

Implications of CA decision on whether it was abuse of process for bank to pursue remedy against mortgagor by suing on personal covenant which could result in bankruptcy following successful defence of possession proceedings by wife. [From Legal Journals Index]

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.