An AI formalism for competing claims of identification: capturing the "Smemorato di Collegno" amnesia case

A formal representation is given of the situational structure, and the agents' beliefs about personal identity, in the Smemorato di Collegno amnesia case tried in 1927, in Pollenza, Italy. Another section discusses and formalizes a sample heuristic rule for conjecturing whether an individual identity other than personal, being conveyed by a toponym, was used literally or fictitiously in a given historical corpus of legal casenotes. For example, a landlocked city being named and referred to as though it was a sea port is a fairly good cue for assuming that the toponym is a disguise. Yet, the interpretation is governed by other conventions, when in a play by Shakeaspeare it is stated that a given scene is set on the sea coast of Bohemia. Further discussion of a situational casuistry for identification (especially individual and personal) along with more formal representations will appear in a companion paper "nissanidentifpirandello", also at the disciplinary meet of AI formalisms and legal applications.

HyperJoseph: the hypertextual organization. Epistemological considerations

HYPERJOSEPH combines hypertext, information retrieval, literary studies, Biblical scholarship, and linguistics. Dialectically, this paper contrasts hypertextual form (the extant tool) and AI-captured content (a desideratum), in the HYPERJOSEPH project. The discussion is more general and oriented to epistemology.

From ALIBI to COLUMBUS. The long march to self-aware, reflective computational models of humor

One thing is (a) to develop a system that handles some task to one's satisfaction, and also has a universally recognized myrthful side to its output. Another thing is (b) to provide an analysis of why you are getting such a byproduct. Yet another thing is (c) to develop a model that incorporates reflection about some phenomenon in humor for its own sake. This paper selects for discussion especially Alibi, going on to describe the preliminaries of Columbus. The former, which fits in (a), is a planner with an explanatory capability. It invents pretexts. It's no legal defense, but it is relevant to evidential thinking in AI & Law. Some of the output pretext are myrthful. Not in the sense they are silly: they are not. A key factor seems to be the very alacrity at explaining out detail after detail of globally damning evidence. I attempt a reanalysis of Alibi in respect of (b). As to Columbus, it fits instead in (c). We introduce here the basics of this (unimplemented) model, developed to account for a sample text in parody.

Temporal structure and enablement representation for mutual wills: A Petri net approach

Those temporal formalisms that are sporadically found nowadays in the literature of AI & Law are based on temporal logic. We claim a revived role for another major class of temporal representation: Petri nets. This formalism, popular in computing from the 1970s, had its potential recognized on occasion in the literature of legal computing as well, but apparently the discipline has lost sight of it, and its practitioners on average need be tutored into this kind of representation. Asynchronous, concurrent processes—for which the approach is well‐suited—are found in the legal domain, in disparate contexts. We develop an example for Mutual Wills.

Temporal representation of state transitions

This paper describes a knowledge-based temporal representation of state transitions for industrial real-time systems. To allow expression of uncertainty, we shall define fluents as disjuncts of positive/negative time-varying properties. A state of the world is represented as a collection of fluents, which is usually incomplete in the sense that neither the positive form nor the negative form of some properties can be implied from it. The world under consideration is assumed to persist in a given state until an action(s) takes place to effect a transition of it into another state, where actions may either be instantaneous or durative. High-level causal laws are characterized in terms of relationships between actions and the involved world states. An effect completion axiom is imposed on each causal law to guarantee that all the fluents that can be affected by the performance of the corresponding action are governed. This completion requirement is practical for most industrial real-time applications and in fact provides a simple and effective treatment to the so-called frame problem.

Guest Editorial. Special Issue: Temporal logic in engineering

Logic-based models are thriving within artificial intelligence. A great number of new logics have been defined, and their theory investigated. Epistemic logics introduce modal operators for knowledge or belief; deontic logics are about norms, and introduce operators of deontic necessity and possibility (i.e., obligation or prohibition). And then we have a much investigated class—temporal logics—to whose application to engineering this special issue is devoted. This kind of formalism deserves increased widespread recognition and application in engineering, a domain where other kinds of temporal models (e.g., Petri nets) are by now a fairly standard part of the modelling toolbox.

Reified temporal logics: an overview

There are three main approaches to the representation of temporal information in AI literature: the so-called method of temporal arguments that simply extends functions and predicates of first-order language to include time as the additional argument; modal temporal logics which are extensions ofthe propositional or predicate calculus with modal temporal operators; and reified temporal logics which reify standard propositions of some initial language (e.g., the classical first-order or modal logic) as objects denoting propositional terms. The objective of this paper is to provide an overview onthe temporal reified approach by looking closely atsome representative existing systems featuring reified propositions, including those of Allen, McDermott, Shoham, Reichgelt, Galton, and Ma and Knight. We shall demonstrate that, although reified logics might be more complicated in expressing assertions about some given objects with respect to different times, they accord a special status to time and therefore have several distinct advantages in talking about some important issues which would be difficult (if not impossible) to express in other approaches.

Culture-bound technological solutions: An artificial theoretic insight

Sometimes, technological solutions to practical problems are devised that conspicuously take into account the constraints to which a given culture is subjecting the particular task or the manner in which it is carried out. The culture may be a professional culture (e.g., the practice of law), or an ethnic-cum-professional culture (e.g., dance in given ethnic cultures from South-East Asia), or, again, a denominational culture prescribing an orthopraxy impinging on everyday life through, for example, prescribed abstinence from given categories of workday activities, or dietary laws. Massimo Negrotti's Theory of the artificial is a convenient framework for discussing some of these techniques. We discuss a few examples, but focus on the contrast of two that are taken from the same cultural background, namely, technological applications in compliance with Jewish Law orthopraxy. •Soya-, mycoprotein- or otherwise derived meat surrogates are an example ofnaturoid; they emulate the flavours and olfactory properties, as well as the texture and the outer and inner appearance, of the meat product (its kind, cut, form) they set out to emulate (including amenability to cooking in the usual manner for the model), while satisfying cultural dietary prohibitions. •In contrast, the Sabbath Notebook, a writing surrogate we describe in this paper, is atechnoid: it emulates a technique (writing to store alphanumeric information), while satisfying the prohibition of writing at particular times of the liturgical calendar (the Sabbath and the major holidays).

The Jama legal narrative. Part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, we reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: "The Jama Model. On Legal Narratives and Interpretation Patterns"), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story, is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability was infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for AI researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flouishing among legal scholars. Nowadays both the the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and Bayesioskeptics (e.g. Ron Allen) among those legal scholars whoare involved in the controversy are willing to give AI researchers a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application or probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making (Rosoni 1995). Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

Distributed belief revision as applied within a descriptive model of jury deliberations

Belief revision is a well-research topic within AI. We argue that the new model of distributed belief revision as discussed here is suitable for general modelling of judicial decision making, along with extant approach as known from jury research. The new approach to belief revision is of general interest, whenever attitudes to information are to be simulated within a multi-agent environment with agents holding local beliefs yet by interaction with, and influencing, other agents who are deliberating collectively. In the approach proposed, it's the entire group of agents, not an external supervisor, who integrate the different opinions. This is achieved through an election mechanism, The principle of "priority to the incoming information" as known from AI models of belief revision are problematic, when applied to factfinding by a jury. The present approach incorporates a computable model for local belief revision, such that a principle of recoverability is adopted. By this principle, any previously held belief must belong to the current cognitive state if consistent with it. For the purposes of jury simulation such a model calls for refinement. Yet we claim, it constitutes a valid basis for an open system where other AI functionalities (or outer stiumuli) could attempt to handle other aspects of the deliberation which are more specifi to legal narrative, to argumentation in court, and then to the debate among the jurors.

Kappa calculus and evidential strength: A note on Åqvist's logical theory of legal evidence

Lennart Åqvist (1992) proposed a logical theory of legal evidence, based on the Bolding-Ekelöf of degrees of evidential strength. This paper reformulates Åqvist's model in terms of the probabilistic version of the kappa calculus. Proving its acceptability in the legal context is beyond the present scope, but the epistemological debate about Bayesian Law isclearly relevant. While the present model is a possible link to that lineof inquiry, we offer some considerations about the broader picture of thepotential of AI & Law in the evidentiary context. Whereas probabilisticreasoning is well-researched in AI, calculations about the threshold ofpersuasion in litigation, whatever their value, are just the tip of theiceberg. The bulk of the modeling desiderata is arguably elsewhere, if one isto ideally make the most of AI's distinctive contribution as envisaged forlegal evidence research.

The Jama legal narrative part I: The JAMA Model and narrative interpretation patterns

For the purposes of starting to tackle, within artificial intelligence (AI), the narrative aspects of legal narratives in a criminal evidence perspective, traditional AI models of narrative understanding can arguably supplement extant models of legal narratives from the scholarly literature of law, jury studies, or the semiotics of law. Not only: the literary (or cinematic) models prominent in a given culture impinge, with their poetic conventions, on the way members of the culture make sense of the world. This shows glaringly in the sample narrative from the Continent-the Jama murder, the inquiry, and the public outcry-we analyse in this paper. Apparently in the same racist crime category as the case of Stephen Lawrence's murder (in Greenwich on 22 April 1993) with the ensuing still current controversy in the UK, the Jama case (some 20 years ago) stood apart because of a very unusual element: the eyewitnesses identifying the suspects were a group of football referees and linesmen eating together at a restaurant, and seeing the sleeping man as he was set ablaze in a public park nearby. Professional background as witnesses-cum-factfinders in a mass sport, and public perceptions of their required characteristics, couldn't but feature prominently in the public perception of the case, even more so as the suspects were released by the magistrate conducting the inquiry. There are sides to this case that involve different expected effects in an inquisitorial criminal procedure system from the Continent, where an investigating magistrate leads the inquiry and prepares the prosecution case, as opposed to trial by jury under the Anglo-American adversarial system. In the JAMA prototype, we tried to approach the given case from the coign of vantage of narrative models from AI.

The Jama legal narrative part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches, which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, I reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: 'The JAMA Model and Narrative Interpretation Patterns'), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability were infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially Bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flourishing among legal scholars; nowadays both the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and the Bayesio-skeptics (e.g. Ron Allen), among those legal scholars who are involved in the controversy, are willing to give AI research a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application of probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making. Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

Belief revision as applied within a descriptive model of jury deliberations

Belief revision is a well-researched topic within Artificial Intelligence (AI). We argue that the new model of belief revision as discussed here is suitable for general modelling of judicial decision making, along with the extant approach as known from jury research. The new approach to belief revision is of general interest, whenever attitudes to information are to be simulated within a multi-agent environment with agents holding local beliefs yet by interacting with, and influencing, other agents who are deliberating collectively. The principle of 'priority to the incoming information', as known from AI models of belief revision, is problematic when applied to factfinding by a jury. The present approach incorporates a computable model for local belief revision, such that a principle of recoverability is adopted. By this principle, any previously held belief must belong to the current cognitive state if consistent with it. For the purposes of jury simulation such a model calls for refinement. Yet, we claim, it constitutes a valid basis for an open system where other AI functionalities (or outer stimuli) could attempt to handle other aspects of the deliberation which are more specific to legal narratives, to argumentation in court, and then to the debate among the jurors.