Managing the supply side for product development in China: a Guanxi network approach

Based on the IMP research tradition this paper regards relationships and networks as key issues in the product development and supply management agenda. Within business networks, co-development is only possible to be analysed when emphasis is placed on interdependences and interactive relationships. Co-development usually implies close relationships that allow companies to rely on each other's resources. Close relationships imply interdependences, which may improve companies' technical and product development. By looking at the actual interactions - between a UK company and its Chinese suppliers - that led to an innovative solution and a successful product launch, evolving relationship patterns are identified and analysed in a case study. Both the literature review and case study findings highlight the importance of the 'guanxi' concept (meaning interpersonal relationships in Mandarin) when analysing business-to-business networks in China. Hence, it is suggested that guanxi-based thinking and acting should be incorporated into the interaction model when considering business networking that embrace China. 'Guanxi' broadens the validity of the interaction model, in terms of geographical proximity, and deepens its theoretical base. The case study provides valuable insights for supply management under a product development context in China. In practice, the main point of interest is that Chinese suppliers are important 'resource' providers as well as 'network' providers. Hence, it is suggested that guanxi practice should be reflected into theoretical developments.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

Cyclic voltammetry and spectroelectrochemical study of nickel and cobalt diphenyltetraazaannulene complexes

The absorption spectra. cyclic voltammetry and spectroelectrochemistry of [Ni(II)DPTAA] and [Co(II)DPTAA] (DPTAA = 6,13-diphenyldibenzo[b,i][1,4,8,11] tetraaza[14]annulene) complexes in DMF are reported in detail. The ligand oxidation is observed for [Ni(II)DPTAA] at +0.70 V vs. SCE whereas Ni2(+/+) occurs at - 1.60 V. For [Co(II)DPTAA], a ligand oxidation redox couple is seen at +0.56 V while the Co2+/+ and Co2+/3+ redox couples appear at -1.21 and +0.24 V, respectively. All observed redox couples are assigned to reversible one-electron processes on account of peak separations and scan-rate dependency. These processes were further investigated by spectroelectrochemistry for [Co(II)DPTAA]. For [Co(II)DPTAA], axial ligation of pyridine was found to shift the Co2+/3+ redox couple more negative. while the ligand oxidation was shifted to more positive potentials. From a spectrophotometric titration of [Co(II)DPTAA] with pyridine an equilibrium constant, K-f, was determined for the binding of pyridine to [Co(II)DPTAA]. This was found to be 10.2 dm(3) mol(-1), slightly lower than that of [Co(II)TAA], indicating the influence of the phenyl groups. From this value and shifts in the Co2+/3+ redox couple upon ligation, an equilibrium constant for the binding of pyridine to [Co(III)DPTAA], K'(f), was found to be 5.06 x 10(6) dm(3) mol(-1). (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Peat, pine stumps and people: interactions behind climate, vegetation change and human activity in wetland archaeology at Loch Farlary, Northern Scotland

First paragraph: In 1993, a peat-cutter, Bruce Field, working on the blanket peat bank he rented from the Sutherland Estate by Loch Farlary, above Golspie in Sutherland (fig 1), reported to Scottish Natural Heritage and Historic Scotland several pieces of pine wood bearing axe marks. Their depth in the peat suggested the cut marks to be prehistoric. This paper summarizes the work undertaken to understand the age and archaeological significance of this find (see also Tipping et al 2001 in press). The pine trees were initially thought to be part of a population that flourished briefly across northern Scotland in the middle of the Holocene period from c 4800 cal BP (Huntley, Daniell & Allen 1997). The subsequent collapse across northernmost Scotland of this population, the pine decline, at around 4200-4000 cal BP is unexplained: climate change has been widely assumed (Dubois & Ferguson 1985; Bridge, Haggart & Lowe 1990; Gear & Huntley 1991) but anthropogenic activity has not been disproved (Birks 1975; Bennett 1995). It was hypothesized that the Farlary find would allow for the first time the direct link between human woodland clearance and the Early Bronze Age pine decline.