Using social network analysis to identify key stakeholders in agricultural biodiversity governance and related land-use decisions at regional and local level

In 2013 the European Commission launched its new green infrastructure strategy to make another attempt to stop and possibly reverse the loss of biodiversity until 2020, by connecting habitats in the wider landscape. This means that conservation would go beyond current practices to include landscapes that are dominated by conventional agriculture, where biodiversity conservation plays a minor role at best. The green infrastructure strategy aims at bottom-up rather than top-down implementation, and suggests including local and regional stakeholders. Therefore, it is important to know which stakeholders influence land-use decisions concerning green infrastructure at the local and regional level. The research presented in this paper served to select stakeholders in preparation for a participatory scenario development process to analyze consequences of different implementation options of the European green infrastructure strategy. We used a mix of qualitative and quantitative social network analysis (SNA) methods to combine actors’ attributes, especially concerning their perceived influence, with structural and relational measures. Further, our analysis provides information on institutional backgrounds and governance settings for green infrastructure and agricultural policy. The investigation started with key informant interviews at the regional level in administrative units responsible for relevant policies and procedures such as regional planners, representatives of federal ministries, and continued at the local level with farmers and other members of the community. The analysis revealed the importance of information flows and regulations but also of social pressure, considerably influencing biodiversity governance with respect to green infrastructure and biodiversity.

Increased water charges improve efficiency and equity in an irrigation system

Conventional wisdom in many agricultural systems across the world is that farmers cannot, will not, or should not pay the full costs associated with surface water delivery. Across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, only a handful can claim complete recovery of operation, maintenance, and capital costs; across Central and South Asia, fees are lower still, with farmers in Nepal, India, and Kazakhstan paying fractions of a U.S. penny for a cubic meter of water. In Pakistan, fees amount to roughly USD 1-2 per acre per season. However, farmers in Pakistan spend orders of magnitude more for diesel fuel to pump groundwater each season, suggesting a latent willingness to spend for water that, under the right conditions, could potentially be directed toward water-use fees for surface water supply. Although overall performance could be expected to improve with greater cost recovery, asymmetric access to water in canal irrigation systems leaves the question open as to whether those benefits would be equitably shared among all farmers in the system. We develop an agent-based model (ABM) of a small irrigation command to examine efficiency and equity outcomes across a range of different cost structures for the maintenance of the system, levels of market development, and assessed water charges. We find that, robust to a range of different cost and structural conditions, increased water charges lead to gains in both efficiency and concomitant improvements in equity as investments in canal infrastructure and system maintenance improve the conveyance of water resources further down watercourses. This suggests that, under conditions in which (1) farmers are currently spending money to pump groundwater to compensate for a failing surface water system, and (2) there is the possibility that through initial investment to provide perceptibly better water supply, genuine win-win solutions can be attained through higher water-use fees to beneficiary farmers.