Promoting Decent Work in Global Supply Chains in Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues, Good Practices, Lessons Learned and Policy Insights

The report is based on a desk-based review, drawing upon existing studies of global supply chains (GSCs) to examine their impacts and implications for the development of domestic firms, their contribution to productive transformation and structural change and their impacts on the quantity and quality of jobs in the LAC region. It situates the expansion of GSCs in the region within an analytical framework that recognizes both the economic and social upgrading dimensions and the impacts on firms and workers. Special attention is given to the mechanisms for governing the terms and conditions of engagement between firms and between firms and workers in GSCs, with the aim of identifying ways to jointly pursue the goals of raising competitiveness and of promoting productive employment and decent work.

Institutions, Innovation, and Grassroots Change: Alternatives to Transnational Governance in the Global South

Transnational governance has been advanced as a viable option for regulating commodities produced in emerging economies—where incapable or unwilling states may undersupply institutions requisite for overseeing supply chains consistent with the quality, safety, environmental, or social standards demanded by the global marketplace. Producers from these jurisdictions, otherwise left with few venues for securing market access and price premiums, ostensibly benefit from whatever pathways transnational actors offer to minimize barriers to entry—including voluntary certification for compliance with a panoply of public and private rules, such as those promulgated by NGOs like the Fair Trade Federation or multinational retailers like Wal-Mart. Yet, such transnational “sustainability” governance may neither be effective nor desirable. Regulatory schemes, like third-party certification, often privilege the interests of primary architects and beneficiaries—private business associations, governments, NGOs, and consumers in the global North—over regulatory targets—producers in the global South. Rather than engaging with the international marketplace via imported and externally-driven schemes, some producer groups are instead challenging existing rules and innovating homegrown institutions. These alternatives to commercialization adopt some institutional characteristics of their transnational counterparts yet deliver benefits in a manner more aligned with the needs of producers. Drawing on original empirical cases from Nicaragua and Mexico, this dissertation examines the role of domestic institutional alternatives to transnational governance in enhancing market access, environmental quality and rural livelihoods within producer communities. Unlike the more technocratic and expert-driven approaches characteristic of mainstream governance efforts, these local regulatory institutions build upon the social capital, indigenous identity, “ancestral” knowledge, and human assets of producer communities as new sources of power and legitimacy in governing agricultural commodities.

Public-Private Partnership Design for Inclusive Cocoa Global Value Chains in Ghana

Within 10 years, there could be a severe global shortage in the supply of cocoa, according to industry practitioners and other experts. Due to global population growth and the emergence of a growing global middle class, by 2025 the cocoa crop would need to increase by nearly 50 per cent to keep up with projected demand. A potential shortage of supply is a direct threat to the business model of lead firms – including cocoa grinders and processors, chocolate confectioners, and retail distributors. But these international firms – the ones that will suffer the most if there is a shortage of cocoa supply – are helping create the market failure that is stifling sustainability. Functioning as a two-tiered consolidated oligopoly with a combined market share of approximately 89%, these firms enjoy the largest portion of value capture in the cocoa-chocolate global value chain (GVC). The smallholder cocoa producers, conversely, are trapped in low value-add segments of the GVC. In fact, most smallholder farmers survive on less than $1.00 per day per capita, on average in many cocoa exporting countries. In Ghana - the second largest producer of cocoa in the world - the government has accomplished little to help these smallholders upgrade and make cocoa an attractive sector for the next generation to inherit. The result – both in Ghana and around the world – is a lack of sustainability of the supply of cocoa. Demand is already beginning to outstrip supply. As a result of these underlying circumstances, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has posed the following policy question: "Under what conditions could USAID, as a development agency, support and enhance potential public-private partnerships in order to improve the bargaining power (and financial wherewithal) of smallholder organizations and farmers in the context of the global value chain for cocoa in Ghana?"