A memory-based model of posttraumatic stress disorder: evaluating basic assumptions underlying the PTSD diagnosis.

In the mnemonic model of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the current memory of a negative event, not the event itself, determines symptoms. The model is an alternative to the current event-based etiology of PTSD represented in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The model accounts for important and reliable findings that are often inconsistent with the current diagnostic view and that have been neglected by theoretical accounts of the disorder, including the following observations. The diagnosis needs objective information about the trauma and peritraumatic emotions but uses retrospective memory reports that can have substantial biases. Negative events and emotions that do not satisfy the current diagnostic criteria for a trauma can be followed by symptoms that would otherwise qualify for PTSD. Predisposing factors that affect the current memory have large effects on symptoms. The inability-to-recall-an-important-aspect-of-the-trauma symptom does not correlate with other symptoms. Loss or enhancement of the trauma memory affects PTSD symptoms in predictable ways. Special mechanisms that apply only to traumatic memories are not needed, increasing parsimony and the knowledge that can be applied to understanding PTSD.

Narrative centrality and negative affectivity: independent and interactive contributors to stress reactions.

Reactions to stressful negative events have long been studied using approaches based on either the narrative interpretation of the event or the traits of the individual. Here, we integrate these 2 approaches by using individual-differences measures of both the narrative interpretation of the stressful event as central to one's life and the personality characteristic of negative affectivity. We show that they each have independent contributions to stress reactions and that high levels on both produce greater than additive effects. The effects on posttraumatic stress symptoms are substantial for both undergraduates (Study 1, n = 2,296; Study 3, n = 488) and veterans (Study 2, n = 104), with mean levels for participants low on both measures near floor on posttraumatic stress symptoms and those high on both measures scoring at or above diagnostic thresholds. Study 3 included 3 measures of narrative centrality and 3 of negative affectivity to demonstrate that the effects were not limited to a single measure. In Study 4 (n = 987), measures associated with symptoms of posttraumatic stress correlated substantially with either measures of narrative centrality or measures of negative affectivity. The concepts of narrative centrality and negative affectivity and the results are consistent with findings from clinical populations using similar measures and with current approaches to therapy. In broad nonclinical populations, such as those used here, the results suggest that we might be able to substantially increase our ability to account for the severity of stress response by including both concepts.

The coherence of memories for trauma: evidence from posttraumatic stress disorder.

Participants with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and participants with a trauma but without PTSD wrote narratives of their trauma and, for comparison, of the most-important and the happiest events that occurred within a year of their trauma. They then rated these three events on coherence. Based on participants' self-ratings and on naïve-observer scorings of the participants' narratives, memories of traumas were not more incoherent than the comparison memories in participants in general or in participants with PTSD. This study comprehensively assesses narrative coherence using a full two (PTSD or not) by two (traumatic event or not) design. The results are counter to most prevalent theoretical views of memory for trauma.

Contrasting Models of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Reply to Monroe and Mineka (2008)

The authors address the 4 main points in S. M. Monroe and S. Mineka's (2008) comment. First, the authors show that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis includes an etiology and that it is based on a theoretical model with a distinguished history in psychology and psychiatry. Two tenets of this theoretical model are that voluntary (strategic) recollections of the trauma are fragmented and incomplete while involuntary (spontaneous) recollections are vivid and persistent and yield privileged access to traumatic material. Second, the authors describe differences between their model and other cognitive models of PTSD. They argue that these other models share the same 2 tenets as the diagnosis and show that these 2 tenets are largely unsupported by empirical evidence. Third, the authors counter arguments about the strength of the evidence favoring the mnemonic model. Fourth, they show that concerns about the causal role of memory in PTSD are based on views of causality that are generally inappropriate for the explanation of PTSD in the social and biological sciences. © 2008 American Psychological Association.