Latent Space and Social Psychological Models of Diffusion

The problem of social diffusion has animated sociological thinking on topics ranging from the spread of an idea, an innovation or a disease, to the foundations of collective behavior and political polarization. While network diffusion has been a productive metaphor, the reality of diffusion processes is often muddier. Ideas and innovations diffuse differently from diseases, but, with a few exceptions, the diffusion of ideas and innovations has been modeled under the same assumptions as the diffusion of disease. In this dissertation, I develop two new diffusion models for "socially meaningful" contagions that address two of the most significant problems with current diffusion models: (1) that contagions can only spread along observed ties, and (2) that contagions do not change as they spread between people. I augment insights from these statistical and simulation models with an analysis of an empirical case of diffusion - the use of enterprise collaboration software in a large technology company. I focus the empirical study on when people abandon innovations, a crucial, and understudied aspect of the diffusion of innovations. Using timestamped posts, I analyze when people abandon software to a high degree of detail.

To address the first problem, I suggest a latent space diffusion model. Rather than treating ties as stable conduits for information, the latent space diffusion model treats ties as random draws from an underlying social space, and simulates diffusion over the social space. Theoretically, the social space model integrates both actor ties and attributes simultaneously in a single social plane, while incorporating schemas into diffusion processes gives an explicit form to the reciprocal influences that cognition and social environment have on each other. Practically, the latent space diffusion model produces statistically consistent diffusion estimates where using the network alone does not, and the diffusion with schemas model shows that introducing some cognitive processing into diffusion processes changes the rate and ultimate distribution of the spreading information. To address the second problem, I suggest a diffusion model with schemas. Rather than treating information as though it is spread without changes, the schema diffusion model allows people to modify information they receive to fit an underlying mental model of the information before they pass the information to others. Combining the latent space models with a schema notion for actors improves our models for social diffusion both theoretically and practically.

The empirical case study focuses on how the changing value of an innovation, introduced by the innovations' network externalities, influences when people abandon the innovation. In it, I find that people are least likely to abandon an innovation when other people in their neighborhood currently use the software as well. The effect is particularly pronounced for supervisors' current use and number of supervisory team members who currently use the software. This case study not only points to an important process in the diffusion of innovation, but also suggests a new approach -- computerized collaboration systems -- to collecting and analyzing data on organizational processes.

The Role of Social Cognition and Person Perception in Economic Social Decision-Making

Social decision-making is often complex, requiring the decision-maker to make social inferences about another person in addition to engaging traditional decision-making processes. However, until recently, much research in neuroeconomics and behavioral economics has examined social decision-making while failing to take into account the importance of the social context and social cognitive processes that are engaged when viewing another person. Using social psychological theory to guide our hypotheses, four research studies investigate the role of social cognition and person perception in guiding economic decisions made in social contexts. The first study (Chapter 2) demonstrates that only specific types of social information engage brain regions implicated in social cognition and hinder learning in social contexts. Study 2 (Chapter 3) extends these findings and examines contexts in which this social information is used to generalize across contexts to form predictions about another person’s behavior. Study 3 (Chapter 4) demonstrates that under certain contexts these social cognitive processes may be withheld in order to more effectively complete the task at hand. Last, Study 4 (Chapter 5) examines how this knowledge of social cognitive processing can be used to change behavior in a prosocial group context. Taken together, these studies add to the growing body of literature examining decision-making in social contexts and highlight the importance of social cognitive processing in guiding these decisions. Although social cognitive processing typically facilitates social interactions, these processes may alter economic decision-making in social contexts.

Social Decision-Making in Bonobos and Chimpanzees

Humans are natural politicians. We obsessively collect social information that is both observable (e.g., about third-party relationships) and unobservable (e.g., about others’ psychological states), and we strategically employ that information to manage our cooperative and competitive relationships. To what extent are these abilities unique to our species, and how did they evolve? The present dissertation seeks to contribute to these two questions. To do so, I take a comparative perspective, investigating social decision-making in humans’ closest living relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees. In Chapter 1, I review existing literature on theory of mind—or the ability to understand others’ psychological states—in these species. I also present a theoretical framework to guide further investigation of social cognition in bonobos and chimpanzees based on hypotheses about the proximate and ultimate origins of their species differences. In Chapter 2, I experimentally investigate differences in the prosocial behavior of bonobos and chimpanzees, revealing species-specific prosocial motivations that appear to be less flexible than those exhibited by humans. In Chapter 3, I explore through decision-making experiments bonobos’ ability to evaluate others based on their prosocial or antisocial behavior during third-party interactions. Bonobos do track the interactions of third-parties and evaluate actors based on these interactions. However, they do not exhibit the human preference for those who are prosocial towards others, instead consistently favoring an antisocial individual. The motivation to prefer those who demonstrate a prosocial disposition may be a unique feature of human psychology that contributes to our ultra-cooperative nature. In Chapter 4, I investigate the adaptive value of social cognition in wild primates. I show that the recruitment behavior of wild chimpanzees at Gombe National Park, Tanzania is consistent with the use of third-party knowledge, and that those who appear to use third-party knowledge receive immediate proximate benefits. They escape further aggression from their opponents. These findings directly support the social intelligence hypothesis that social cognition has evolved in response to the demands of competing with one’s own group-mates. Thus, the studies presented here help to better characterize the features of social decision-making that are unique to humans, and how these abilities evolved.

Decision-Making in the Primate Brain

Making decisions is fundamental to everything we do, yet it can be impaired in various disorders and conditions. While research into the neural basis of decision-making has flourished in recent years, many questions remain about how decisions are instantiated in the brain. Here we explored how primates make abstract decisions and decisions in social contexts, as well as one way to non-invasively modulate the brain circuits underlying decision-making. We used rhesus macaques as our model organism. First we probed numerical decision-making, a form of abstract decision-making. We demonstrated that monkeys are able to compare discrete ratios, choosing an array with a greater ratio of positive to negative stimuli, even when this array does not have a greater absolute number of positive stimuli. Monkeys’ performance in this task adhered to Weber’s law, indicating that monkeys—like humans—treat proportions as analog magnitudes. Next we showed that monkeys’ ordinal decisions are influenced by spatial associations; when trained to select the fourth stimulus from the bottom in a vertical array, they subsequently selected the fourth stimulus from the left—and not from the right—in a horizontal array. In other words, they begin enumerating from one side of space and not the other, mirroring the human tendency to associate numbers with space. These and other studies confirmed that monkeys’ numerical decision-making follows similar patterns to that of humans, making them a good model for investigations of the neurobiological basis of numerical decision-making.

We sought to develop a system for exploring the neuronal basis of the cognitive and behavioral effects observed following transcranial magnetic stimulation, a relatively new, non-invasive method of brain stimulation that may be used to treat clinical disorders. We completed a set of pilot studies applying offline low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation to the macaque posterior parietal cortex, which has been implicated in numerical processing, while subjects performed a numerical comparison and control color comparison task, and while electrophysiological activity was recorded from the stimulated region of cortex. We found tentative evidence in one paradigm that stimulation did selectively impair performance in the number task, causally implicating the posterior parietal cortex in numerical decisions. In another paradigm, however, we manipulated the subject’s reaching behavior but not her number or color comparison performance. We also found that stimulation produced variable changes in neuronal firing and local field potentials. Together these findings lay the groundwork for detailed investigations into how different parameters of transcranial magnetic stimulation can interact with cortical architecture to produce various cognitive and behavioral changes.

Finally, we explored how monkeys decide how to behave in competitive social interactions. In a zero-sum computer game in which two monkeys played as a shooter or a goalie during a hockey-like “penalty shot” scenario, we found that shooters developed complex movement trajectories so as to conceal their intentions from the goalies. Additionally, we found that neurons in the dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex played a role in generating this “deceptive” behavior. We conclude that these regions of prefrontal cortex form part of a circuit that guides decisions to make an individual less predictable to an opponent.

Contributions Of the Human Medial Prefrontal Cortex To Associative Recognition Memory: Evidence From Functional Neuroimaging

Neuroimaging studies of episodic memory, or memory of events from our personal past, have predominantly focused their attention on medial temporal lobe (MTL). There is growing acknowledgement however, from the cognitive neuroscience of memory literature, that regions outside the MTL can support episodic memory processes. The medial prefrontal cortex is one such region garnering increasing interest from researchers. Using behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging measures, over two studies, this thesis provides evidence of a mnemonic role of the medial PFC. In the first study, participants were scanned while judging the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the sociopolitical views of unfamiliar individuals. Behavioral tests of associative recognition revealed that participants remembered with high confidence viewpoints previously linked with judgments of strong agreement/disagreement. Neurally, the medial PFC mediated the interaction between high-confidence associative recognition memory and beliefs associated with strong agree/disagree judgments. In an effort to generalize this finding to well-established associative information, in the second study, we investigated associative recognition memory for real-world concepts. Object-scene pairs congruent or incongruent with a preexisting schema were presented to participants in a cued-recall paradigm. Behavioral tests of conceptual and perceptual recognition revealed memory enhancements arising from strong resonance between presented pairs and preexisting schemas. Neurally, the medial PFC tracked increases in visual recall of schema-congruent pairs whereas the MTL tracked increases in visual recall of schema-incongruent pairs. Additionally, ventral areas of the medial PFC tracked conceptual components of visual recall specifically for schema-congruent pairs. These findings are consistent with a recent theoretical proposal of medial PFC contributions to memory for schema-related content. Collectively, these studies provide evidence of a role for the medial PFC in associative recognition memory persisting for associative information deployed in our daily social interactions and for those associations formed over multiple learning episodes. Additionally, this set of findings advance our understanding of the cognitive contributions of the medial PFC beyond its canonical role in processes underlying social cognition.