Testing of Interposer-Based 2.5D Integrated Circuits

The unprecedented and relentless growth in the electronics industry is feeding the demand for integrated circuits (ICs) with increasing functionality and performance at minimum cost and power consumption. As predicted by Moore's law, ICs are being aggressively scaled to meet this demand. While the continuous scaling of process technology is reducing gate delays, the performance of ICs is being increasingly dominated by interconnect delays. In an effort to improve submicrometer interconnect performance, to increase packing density, and to reduce chip area and power consumption, the semiconductor industry is focusing on three-dimensional (3D) integration. However, volume production and commercial exploitation of 3D integration are not feasible yet due to significant technical hurdles.

At the present time, interposer-based 2.5D integration is emerging as a precursor to stacked 3D integration. All the dies and the interposer in a 2.5D IC must be adequately tested for product qualification. However, since the structure of 2.5D ICs is different from the traditional 2D ICs, new challenges have emerged: (1) pre-bond interposer testing, (2) lack of test access, (3) limited ability for at-speed testing, (4) high density I/O ports and interconnects, (5) reduced number of test pins, and (6) high power consumption. This research targets the above challenges and effective solutions have been developed to test both dies and the interposer.

The dissertation first introduces the basic concepts of 3D ICs and 2.5D ICs. Prior work on testing of 2.5D ICs is studied. An efficient method is presented to locate defects in a passive interposer before stacking. The proposed test architecture uses e-fuses that can be programmed to connect or disconnect functional paths inside the interposer. The concept of a die footprint is utilized for interconnect testing, and the overall assembly and test flow is described. Moreover, the concept of weighted critical area is defined and utilized to reduce test time. In order to fully determine the location of each e-fuse and the order of functional interconnects in a test path, we also present a test-path design algorithm. The proposed algorithm can generate all test paths for interconnect testing.

In order to test for opens, shorts, and interconnect delay defects in the interposer, a test architecture is proposed that is fully compatible with the IEEE 1149.1 standard and relies on an enhancement of the standard test access port (TAP) controller. To reduce test cost, a test-path design and scheduling technique is also presented that minimizes a composite cost function based on test time and the design-for-test (DfT) overhead in terms of additional through silicon vias (TSVs) and micro-bumps needed for test access. The locations of the dies on the interposer are taken into consideration in order to determine the order of dies in a test path.

To address the scenario of high density of I/O ports and interconnects, an efficient built-in self-test (BIST) technique is presented that targets the dies and the interposer interconnects. The proposed BIST architecture can be enabled by the standard TAP controller in the IEEE 1149.1 standard. The area overhead introduced by this BIST architecture is negligible; it includes two simple BIST controllers, a linear-feedback-shift-register (LFSR), a multiple-input-signature-register (MISR), and some extensions to the boundary-scan cells in the dies on the interposer. With these extensions, all boundary-scan cells can be used for self-configuration and self-diagnosis during interconnect testing. To reduce the overall test cost, a test scheduling and optimization technique under power constraints is described.

In order to accomplish testing with a small number test pins, the dissertation presents two efficient ExTest scheduling strategies that implements interconnect testing between tiles inside an system on chip (SoC) die on the interposer while satisfying the practical constraint that the number of required test pins cannot exceed the number of available pins at the chip level. The tiles in the SoC are divided into groups based on the manner in which they are interconnected. In order to minimize the test time, two optimization solutions are introduced. The first solution minimizes the number of input test pins, and the second solution minimizes the number output test pins. In addition, two subgroup configuration methods are further proposed to generate subgroups inside each test group.

Finally, the dissertation presents a programmable method for shift-clock stagger assignment to reduce power supply noise during SoC die testing in 2.5D ICs. An SoC die in the 2.5D IC is typically composed of several blocks and two neighboring blocks that share the same power rails should not be toggled at the same time during shift. Therefore, the proposed programmable method does not assign the same stagger value to neighboring blocks. The positions of all blocks are first analyzed and the shared boundary length between blocks is then calculated. Based on the position relationships between the blocks, a mathematical model is presented to derive optimal result for small-to-medium sized problems. For larger designs, a heuristic algorithm is proposed and evaluated.

In summary, the dissertation targets important design and optimization problems related to testing of interposer-based 2.5D ICs. The proposed research has led to theoretical insights, experiment results, and a set of test and design-for-test methods to make testing effective and feasible from a cost perspective.

Game-Theoretically Allocating Resources to Catch Evaders and Payments to Stabilize Teams

Allocating resources optimally is a nontrivial task, especially when multiple

self-interested agents with conflicting goals are involved. This dissertation

uses techniques from game theory to study two classes of such problems:

allocating resources to catch agents that attempt to evade them, and allocating

payments to agents in a team in order to stabilize it. Besides discussing what

allocations are optimal from various game-theoretic perspectives, we also study

how to efficiently compute them, and if no such algorithms are found, what

computational hardness results can be proved.

The first class of problems is inspired by real-world applications such as the

TOEFL iBT test, course final exams, driver's license tests, and airport security

patrols. We call them test games and security games. This dissertation first

studies test games separately, and then proposes a framework of Catcher-Evader

games (CE games) that generalizes both test games and security games. We show

that the optimal test strategy can be efficiently computed for scored test

games, but it is hard to compute for many binary test games. Optimal Stackelberg

strategies are hard to compute for CE games, but we give an empirically

efficient algorithm for computing their Nash equilibria. We also prove that the

Nash equilibria of a CE game are interchangeable.

The second class of problems involves how to split a reward that is collectively

obtained by a team. For example, how should a startup distribute its shares, and

what salary should an enterprise pay to its employees. Several stability-based

solution concepts in cooperative game theory, such as the core, the least core,

and the nucleolus, are well suited to this purpose when the goal is to avoid

coalitions of agents breaking off. We show that some of these solution concepts

can be justified as the most stable payments under noise. Moreover, by adjusting

the noise models (to be arguably more realistic), we obtain new solution

concepts including the partial nucleolus, the multiplicative least core, and the

multiplicative nucleolus. We then study the computational complexity of those

solution concepts under the constraint of superadditivity. Our result is based

on what we call Small-Issues-Large-Team games and it applies to popular

representation schemes such as MC-nets.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.