Essays on the Dynamic Decisions of Homeowners and Retailers

Urban problems have several features that make them inherently dynamic. Large transaction costs all but guarantee that homeowners will do their best to consider how a neighborhood might change before buying a house. Similarly, stores face large sunk costs when opening, and want to be sure that their investment will pay off in the long run. In line with those concerns, different areas of Economics have made recent advances in modeling those questions within a dynamic framework. This dissertation contributes to those efforts.

Chapter 2 discusses how to model an agent’s location decision when the agent must learn about an exogenous amenity that may be changing over time. The model is applied to estimating the marginal willingness to pay to avoid crime, in which agents are learning about the crime rate in a neighborhood, and the crime rate can change in predictable (Markovian) ways.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on location decision problems when there are externalities between decision makers. Chapter 3 focuses on the decision of business owners to open a store, when its demand is a function of other nearby stores, either through competition, or through spillovers on foot traffic. It uses a dynamic model in continuous time to model agents’ decisions. A particular challenge is isolating the contribution of spillovers from the contribution of other unobserved neighborhood attributes that could also lead to agglomeration. A key contribution of this chapter is showing how we can use information on storefront ownership to help separately identify spillovers.

Finally, chapter 4 focuses on a class of models in which families prefer to live

close to similar neighbors. This chapter provides the first simulation of such a model in which agents are forward looking, and shows that this leads to more segregation than it would have been observed with myopic agents, which is the standard in this literature. The chapter also discusses several extensions of the model that can be used to investigate relevant questions such as the arrival of a large contingent high skilled tech workers in San Francisco, the immigration of hispanic families to several southern American cities, large changes in local amenities, such as the construction of magnet schools or metro stations, and the flight of wealthy residents from cities in the Rust belt, such as Detroit.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.

Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form and coordination

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer. © 2010 INFORMS.

Accessibility, availability and affordability of anti-malarials in a rural district in Kenya after implementation of a national subsidy scheme.

BACKGROUND: Poor access to prompt and effective treatment for malaria contributes to high mortality and severe morbidity. In Kenya, it is estimated that only 12% of children receive anti-malarials for their fever within 24 hours. The first point of care for many fevers is a local medicine retailer, such as a pharmacy or chemist. The role of the medicine retailer as an important distribution point for malaria medicines has been recognized and several different strategies have been used to improve the services that these retailers provide. Despite these efforts, many mothers still purchase ineffective drugs because they are less expensive than effective artemisinin combination therapy (ACT). One strategy that is being piloted in several countries is an international subsidy targeted at anti-malarials supplied through the retail sector. The goal of this strategy is to make ACT as affordable as ineffective alternatives. The programme, called the Affordable Medicines Facility - malaria was rolled out in Kenya in August 2010. METHODS: In December 2010, the affordability and accessibility of malaria medicines in a rural district in Kenya were evaluated using a complete census of all public and private facilities, chemists, pharmacists, and other malaria medicine retailers within the Webuye Demographic Surveillance Area. Availability, types, and prices of anti-malarials were assessed. There are 13 public or mission facilities and 97 medicine retailers (registered and unregistered). RESULTS: The average distance from a home to the nearest public health facility is 2 km, but the average distance to the nearest medicine retailer is half that. Quinine is the most frequently stocked anti-malarial (61% of retailers). More medicine retailers stocked sulphadoxine-pyramethamine (SP; 57%) than ACT (44%). Eleven percent of retailers stocked AMFm subsidized artemether-lumefantrine (AL). No retailers had chloroquine in stock and only five were selling artemisinin monotherapy. The mean price of any brand of AL, the recommended first-line drug in Kenya, was $2.7 USD. Brands purchased under the AMFm programme cost 40% less than non-AMFm brands. Artemisinin monotherapies cost on average more than twice as much as AMFm-brand AL. SP cost only $0.5, a fraction of the price of ACT. CONCLUSIONS: AMFm-subsidized anti-malarials are considerably less expensive than unsubsidized AL, but the price difference between effective and ineffective therapies is still large.

Global value chains and agrifood standards: challenges and possibilities for smallholders in developing countries.

The rise of private food standards has brought forth an ongoing debate about whether they work as a barrier for smallholders and hinder poverty reduction in developing countries. This paper uses a global value chain approach to explain the relationship between value chain structure and agrifood safety and quality standards and to discuss the challenges and possibilities this entails for the upgrading of smallholders. It maps four potential value chain scenarios depending on the degree of concentration in the markets for agrifood supply (farmers and manufacturers) and demand (supermarkets and other food retailers) and discusses the impact of lead firms and key intermediaries on smallholders in different chain situations. Each scenario is illustrated with case examples. Theoretical and policy issues are discussed, along with proposals for future research in terms of industry structure, private governance, and sustainable value chains.

Institutions, Innovation, and Grassroots Change: Alternatives to Transnational Governance in the Global South

Transnational governance has been advanced as a viable option for regulating commodities produced in emerging economies—where incapable or unwilling states may undersupply institutions requisite for overseeing supply chains consistent with the quality, safety, environmental, or social standards demanded by the global marketplace. Producers from these jurisdictions, otherwise left with few venues for securing market access and price premiums, ostensibly benefit from whatever pathways transnational actors offer to minimize barriers to entry—including voluntary certification for compliance with a panoply of public and private rules, such as those promulgated by NGOs like the Fair Trade Federation or multinational retailers like Wal-Mart. Yet, such transnational “sustainability” governance may neither be effective nor desirable. Regulatory schemes, like third-party certification, often privilege the interests of primary architects and beneficiaries—private business associations, governments, NGOs, and consumers in the global North—over regulatory targets—producers in the global South. Rather than engaging with the international marketplace via imported and externally-driven schemes, some producer groups are instead challenging existing rules and innovating homegrown institutions. These alternatives to commercialization adopt some institutional characteristics of their transnational counterparts yet deliver benefits in a manner more aligned with the needs of producers. Drawing on original empirical cases from Nicaragua and Mexico, this dissertation examines the role of domestic institutional alternatives to transnational governance in enhancing market access, environmental quality and rural livelihoods within producer communities. Unlike the more technocratic and expert-driven approaches characteristic of mainstream governance efforts, these local regulatory institutions build upon the social capital, indigenous identity, “ancestral” knowledge, and human assets of producer communities as new sources of power and legitimacy in governing agricultural commodities.

Consumer Behavior and Firm Competition

Understanding consumer behavior is critical for firms' decision making. How consumers make decisions about what they want and buy directly affect the profits of firms. Therefore, it is important to consider consumer behaviors and incorporate them into the model when studying the optimal strategy of firms and competition between firms. In this dissertation, I study rich and interesting consumer behaviors and their impact on firms' strategy in two essays. The first essay considers consumers' shopping cost which leads to their preference for one-stop shopping. I examine how store visit costs and consumer knowledge about a product affect the strategic store choice of consumers and, in turn, the pricing, customer service and advertising decisions of competing retailers. My analysis offers insights on how specialty stores can compete with big-box retailers. In the second essay, I focus on a well-established psychology phenomenon, cognitive dissonance. I incorporate the idea of cognitive dissonance into a model of spatial competition and examine its implications for selling strategy. I provide new insight on the profitability of advance selling and spot selling as well as the pricing of bundle and its components. Collectively, two essays in this dissertation introduce novel ways to model consumer behaviors and help to understand the impact of consumer behaviors on firm profitability and strategy.

Food Swamps, Obesity & Health Zoning Restrictions on Fast Food Restaurants

Protecting public health is the most legitimate use of zoning, and yet there is minimal progress in applying it to the obesity problem. Zoning could potentially be used to address both unhealthy and healthy food retailers, but lack of evidence regarding the impact of zoning and public opinion on zoning changes are barriers to implementing zoning restrictions on fast food on a larger scale. My dissertation addresses these gaps in our understanding of health zoning as a policy option for altering built, food environments.

Chapter 1 examines the relationship between food swamps and obesity and whether spatial mapping might be useful in identifying priority geographic areas for zoning interventions. I employ an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to correct for the endogeneity problems associated with food environments, namely that individuals may self-select into certain neighborhoods and may consider food availability in their decision process. I utilize highway exits as a source of exogenous variation .Using secondary data from the USDA Food Environment Atlas, ordinary least squares (OLS) and IV regression models were employed to analyze cross-sectional associations between local food environments and the prevalence of obesity. I find even after controlling for food desert effects, food swamps have a positive, statistically significant effect on adult obesity rates.

Chapter 2 applies theories of message framing and prospect theory to the emerging discussion around health zoning policies targeting food environments and to explore public opinion toward a list of potential zoning restrictions on fast-food restaurants (beyond moratoriums on new establishments). In order to explore causality, I employ an online survey experiment manipulating exposure to vignettes with different message frames about health zoning restrictions with two national samples of adult Americans age 18 and over (N1=2,768 and N2=3,236). The second sample oversamples Black Americans (N=1,000) and individuals with high school as their highest level of education. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of six conditions where they were primed with different message frames about the benefits of zoning restrictions on fast food retailers. Participants were then asked to indicate their support for six zoning policies on a Likert scale. Subjects also answered questions about their food store access, eating behaviors, health status and perceptions of food stores by type.

I find that a message frame about Nutrition and increasing Equity in the food system was particularly effective at increasing support for health zoning policies targeting fast food outlets across policy categories (Conditional, Youth-related, Performance and Incentive) and across racial groups. This finding is consistent with an influential environmental justice scholar’s description of “injustice frames” as effective in mobilizing supporters around environmental issues (Taylor 2000). I extend this rationale to food environment obesity prevention efforts and identify Nutrition combined with Equity frames as an arguably universal campaign strategy for bolstering public support of zoning restrictions on fast food retailers.

Bridging my findings from both Chapters 1 and 2, using food swamps as a spatial metaphor may work to identify priority areas for policy intervention, but only if there is an equitable distribution of resources and mobilization efforts to improve consumer food environments. If the structural forces which ration access to land-use planning persist (arguably including the media as gatekeepers to information and producers of message frames) disparities in obesity are likely to widen.