A COMPARISON OF MARKET CLEARING TOOLS IN ELECTRICITY SYSTEMS

To maintain a strict balance between demand and supply in the US power systems, the Independent System Operators (ISOs) schedule power plants and determine electricity prices using a market clearing model. This model determines for each time period and power plant, the times of startup, shutdown, the amount of power production, and the provisioning of spinning and non-spinning power generation reserves, etc. Such a deterministic optimization model takes as input the characteristics of all the generating units such as their power generation installed capacity, ramp rates, minimum up and down time requirements, and marginal costs for production, as well as the forecast of intermittent energy such as wind and solar, along with the minimum reserve requirement of the whole system. This reserve requirement is determined based on the likelihood of outages on the supply side and on the levels of error forecasts in demand and intermittent generation. With increased installed capacity of intermittent renewable energy, determining the appropriate level of reserve requirements has become harder. Stochastic market clearing models have been proposed as an alternative to deterministic market clearing models. Rather than using a fixed reserve targets as an input, stochastic market clearing models take different scenarios of wind power into consideration and determine reserves schedule as output. Using a scaled version of the power generation system of PJM, a regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia, and wind scenarios generated from BPA (Bonneville Power Administration) data, this paper explores a comparison of the performance between a stochastic and deterministic model in market clearing. The two models are compared in their ability to contribute to the affordability, reliability and sustainability of the electricity system, measured in terms of total operational costs, load shedding and air emissions. The process of building the models and running for tests indicate that a fair comparison is difficult to obtain due to the multi-dimensional performance metrics considered here, and the difficulty in setting up the parameters of the models in a way that does not advantage or disadvantage one modeling framework. Along these lines, this study explores the effect that model assumptions such as reserve requirements, value of lost load (VOLL) and wind spillage costs have on the comparison of the performance of stochastic vs deterministic market clearing models.

Small-scale Fisheries and the Global Economy: Understanding Common-pool Resource Governance in the Context of Market Pressures, Neoliberal Policies, and Transnational Institutions

The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of how global seafood trade interacts with the governance of small-scale fisheries (SSFs). As global seafood trade expands, SSFs have the potential to experience significant economic, social, and political benefits from participation in export markets. At the same time, market connections that place increasing pressures on resources pose risks to both the ecological and social integrity of SSFs. This dissertation seeks to explore the factors that mediate between the potential benefits and risks of global seafood markets for SSFs, with the goal of developing hypotheses regarding these relationships.

The empirical investigation consists of a series of case studies from the Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico. This is a particularly rich context in which to study global market connections with SSFs because the SSFs in this region engage in a variety of market-oriented harvests, most notably for octopus, groupers and snappers, lobster, and sea cucumber. Variation in market forms and the institutional diversity of local-level governance arrangements allows the dissertation to explore a number of examples.

The analysis is guided primarily by common-pool resource (CPR) theory because of the insights it provides regarding the conditions that facilitate collective action and the factors that promote long-lasting resource governance arrangements. Theory from institutional economics and political ecology contribute to the elaboration of a multi-faceted conceptualization of markets for CPR theory, with the aim of facilitating the identification of mechanisms through which markets and CPR governance actually interact. This dissertation conceptualizes markets as sets of institutions that structure the exchange of property rights over fisheries resources, affect the material incentives to harvest resources, and transmit ideas and values about fisheries resources and governance.

The case studies explore four different mechanisms through which markets potentially influence resource governance: 1) Markets can contribute to costly resource governance activities by offsetting costs through profits, 2) markets can undermine resource governance by generating incentives for noncompliance and lead to overharvesting resources, 3) markets can increase the costs of resource governance, for example by augmenting monitoring and enforcement burdens, and 4) markets can alter values and norms underpinning resource governance by transmitting ideas between local resource users and a variety of market actors.

Data collected using participant observation, survey, informal and structured interviews contributed to the elaboration of the following hypotheses relevant to interactions between global seafood trade and SSFs governance. 1) Roll-back neoliberalization of fisheries policies has undermined cooperatives’ ability to achieve financial success through engagement with markets and thus their potential role as key actors in resource governance (chapter two). 2) Different relations of production influence whether local governance institutions will erode or strengthen when faced with market pressures. In particular, relations of production in which fishers own their own means of production and share the collective costs of governance are more likely to strengthen resource governance while relations of production in which a single entrepreneur controls capital and access to the fishery are more likely to contribute to the erosion of resource governance institutions in the face of market pressures (chapter three). 3) By serving as a new discursive framework within which to conceive of and talk about fisheries resources, markets can influence norms and values that shape and constitute governance arrangements.

In sum, the dissertation demonstrates that global seafood trade manifests in a diversity of local forms and effects. Whether SSFs moderate risks and take advantage of benefits depends on a variety of factors, and resource users themselves have the potential to influence the outcomes of seafood market connections through local forms of collective action.