A Qualitative Study of Contextual Factors’ Impact on the Adaptation of a Caregiver-mediated Early Autism Intervention in South Africa

Background: Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a major global health challenge as the majority of individuals with ASD live in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and receive little to no services or support from health or social care systems. Despite this global crisis, the development and validation of ASD interventions has almost exclusively occurred in high-income countries, leaving many unanswered questions regarding what contextual factors would need to be considered to ensure the effectiveness of interventions in LMICs. This study sought to conduct explorative research on the contextual adaptation of a caregiver-mediated early ASD intervention for use in a low-resource setting in South Africa.

Methods: Participants included 22 caregivers of children with autism, including mothers (n=16), fathers (n=4), and grandmothers (n=2). Four focus groups discussions were conducted in Cape Town, South Africa with caregivers and lasted between 1.5-3.5 hours in length. Data was recorded, translated, and transcribed by research personnel. Data was then coded for emerging themes and analyzed using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software package.

Results: Nine contextual factors were reported to be important for the adaptation process including culture, language, location of treatment, cost of treatment, type of service provider, familial needs, length of treatment, support, and parenting practices. One contextual factor, evidence-based treatment, was reported to be both important and not important for adaptation by caregivers. The contextual factor of stigma was identified as an emerging theme and a specifically relevant challenge when developing an ASD intervention for use in a South African context.

Conclusions: Eleven contextual factors were discussed in detail by caregivers and examples were given regarding the challenges, sources, and preferences related to the contextual adaptation of a parent-mediated early ASD intervention in South Africa. Caregivers reported a preference for an affordable, in-home, individualized early ASD intervention, where they have an active voice in shaping treatment goals. Distrust of community-based nurses and health workers to deliver an early ASD intervention and challenges associated with ASD-based stigma were two unanticipated findings from this data set. Implications for practice and further research are discussed.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.