Coal-fired Power Plants with Flexible Amine-based CCS and Co-located Wind Power: Environmental, Economic and Reliability Outcomes

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies provide a means to significantly reduce carbon emissions from the existing fleet of fossil-fired plants, and hence can facilitate a gradual transition from conventional to more sustainable sources of electric power. This is especially relevant for coal plants that have a CO2 emission rate that is roughly two times higher than that of natural gas plants. Of the different kinds of CCS technology available, post-combustion amine based CCS is the best developed and hence more suitable for retrofitting an existing coal plant. The high costs from operating CCS could be reduced by enabling flexible operation through amine storage or allowing partial capture of CO2 during high electricity prices. This flexibility is also found to improve the power plant’s ramp capability, enabling it to offset the intermittency of renewable power sources. This thesis proposes a solution to problems associated with two promising technologies for decarbonizing the electric power system: the high costs of the energy penalty of CCS, and the intermittency and non-dispatchability of wind power. It explores the economic and technical feasibility of a hybrid system consisting of a coal plant retrofitted with a post-combustion-amine based CCS system equipped with the option to perform partial capture or amine storage, and a co-located wind farm. A techno-economic assessment of the performance of the hybrid system is carried out both from the perspective of the stakeholders (utility owners, investors, etc.) as well as that of the power system operator.

In order to perform the assessment from the perspective of the facility owners (e.g., electric power utilities, independent power producers), an optimal design and operating strategy of the hybrid system is determined for both the amine storage and partial capture configurations. A linear optimization model is developed to determine the optimal component sizes for the hybrid system and capture rates while meeting constraints on annual average emission targets of CO2, and variability of the combined power output. Results indicate that there are economic benefits of flexible operation relative to conventional CCS, and demonstrate that the hybrid system could operate as an energy storage system: providing an effective pathway for wind power integration as well as a mechanism to mute the variability of intermittent wind power.

In order to assess the performance of the hybrid system from the perspective of the system operator, a modified Unit Commitment/ Economic Dispatch model is built to consider and represent the techno-economic aspects of operation of the hybrid system within a power grid. The hybrid system is found to be effective in helping the power system meet an average CO2 emissions limit equivalent to the CO2 emission rate of a state-of-the-art natural gas plant, and to reduce power system operation costs and number of instances and magnitude of energy and reserve scarcity.

How does family drug treatment court participation affect child welfare outcomes?

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd.Parental substance use is a risk factor for child maltreatment. Family drug treatment courts (FDTCs) have emerged in the United States as a policy option to treat the underlying condition and promote family preservation. This study examines the effectiveness of FDTCs in North Carolina on child welfare outcomes. Data come from North Carolina records from child protection services, court system, and birth records. Three types of parental participation in a FDTC are considered: referral, enrolling, and completing an FDTC. The sample includes 566 children who were placed into foster care and whose parents participated in a FDTC program. Findings indicate that children of parents who were referred but did not enroll or who enrolled but did not complete had longer stays in foster care than children of completers. Reunification rates for children of completers were also higher. Outcomes for children in the referred and enrolled groups did not differ in the multivariate analyses. While effective substance use treatment services for parents may help preserve families, future research should examine factors for improving participation and completion rates as well as factors involved in scaling programs so that more families are served.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.