Investigating the Tradespace between Increased Automation and Optimal Manning on Aircraft Carrier Decks

With increasing prevalence and capabilities of autonomous systems as part of complex heterogeneous manned-unmanned environments (HMUEs), an important consideration is the impact of the introduction of automation on the optimal assignment of human personnel. The US Navy has implemented optimal staffing techniques before in the 1990's and 2000's with a "minimal staffing" approach. The results were poor, leading to the degradation of Naval preparedness. Clearly, another approach to determining optimal staffing is necessary. To this end, the goal of this research is to develop human performance models for use in determining optimal manning of HMUEs. The human performance models are developed using an agent-based simulation of the aircraft carrier flight deck, a representative safety-critical HMUE. The Personnel Multi-Agent Safety and Control Simulation (PMASCS) simulates and analyzes the effects of introducing generalized maintenance crew skill sets and accelerated failure repair times on the overall performance and safety of the carrier flight deck. A behavioral model of four operator types (ordnance officers, chocks and chains, fueling officers, plane captains, and maintenance operators) is presented here along with an aircraft failure model. The main focus of this work is on the maintenance operators and aircraft failure modeling, since they have a direct impact on total launch time, a primary metric for carrier deck performance. With PMASCS I explore the effects of two variables on total launch time of 22 aircraft: 1) skill level of maintenance operators and 2) aircraft failure repair times while on the catapult (referred to as Phase 4 repair times). It is found that neither introducing a generic skill set to maintenance crews nor introducing a technology to accelerate Phase 4 aircraft repair times improves the average total launch time of 22 aircraft. An optimal manning level of 3 maintenance crews is found under all conditions, the point at which any additional maintenance crews does not reduce the total launch time. An additional discussion is included about how these results change if the operations are relieved of the bottleneck of installing the holdback bar at launch time.

Optimal Capital Requirements in Financial Networks with Fire Sales

I explore and analyze a problem of finding the socially optimal capital requirements for financial institutions considering two distinct channels of contagion: direct exposures among the institutions, as represented by a network and fire sales externalities, which reflect the negative price impact of massive liquidation of assets.These two channels amplify shocks from individual financial institutions to the financial system as a whole and thus increase the risk of joint defaults amongst the interconnected financial institutions; this is often referred to as systemic risk. In the model, there is a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the capital requirements of the financial institutions. The policymaker considers this trade-off and determines the optimal capital requirements for individual financial institutions. I provide a method for finding and analyzing the optimal capital requirements that can be applied to arbitrary network structures and arbitrary distributions of investment returns.

In particular, I first consider a network model consisting only of direct exposures and show that the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic linear programming problem. I then extend the analysis to financial networks with default costs and show the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic mixed integer programming problem. The computational complexity of this problem poses a challenge, and I develop an iterative algorithm that can be efficiently executed. I show that the iterative algorithm leads to solutions that are nearly optimal by comparing it with lower bounds based on a dual approach. I also show that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solution.

Finally, I incorporate fire sales externalities into the model. In particular, I am able to extend the analysis of systemic risk and the optimal capital requirements with a single illiquid asset to a model with multiple illiquid assets. The model with multiple illiquid assets incorporates liquidation rules used by the banks. I provide an optimization formulation whose solution provides the equilibrium payments for a given liquidation rule.

I further show that the socially optimal capital problem using the ``socially optimal liquidation" and prioritized liquidation rules can be formulated as a convex and convex mixed integer problem, respectively. Finally, I illustrate the results of the methodology on numerical examples and

discuss some implications for capital regulation policy and stress testing.